A SURVEY OF CIVIL WAR PERIOD MILITARY SITES IN WEST TENNESSEE

Fred M. Prouty and Gary L. Barker

Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation
Division of Archaeology
Report of Investigations No. 11

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Cover Illustration: The sketch, by Civil War artist Alfred R. Waud, appeared in "Through the Wilderness" by Brevet Major-General Alexander S. Webb, USA, with the caption THROWING UP BREASTWORKS IN THE WILDERNESS, FROM A SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME (Webb 1884-1888:156).
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The 1992-1993 project in West Tennessee was the second archaeological survey conducted by the Division of Archaeology to identify military sites of the American Civil War. The study was the ninth in a series of historic site surveys since the late 1970s that was made possible with federal matching funds administered by the Tennessee Historical Commission. As with past surveys, Stephen T. Rogers on the Commission's staff administered the 1992-1993 contract.

The authors completed fieldwork, archival research, and report preparation under the general supervision of Samuel D. Smith, Division of Archaeology Historical Archaeologist. George F. (Nick) Fielder, State Archaeologist and Division Director, provided general administrative supervision. Benjamin C. Nance assisted with initial survey activities before reassignment to another Division project. Former Division staff members, Jackie Berg and Dr. Robert C. Mainfort, provided fiscal administration and archival research assistance, respectively. Division staff member, Katherine Sanford, provided general assistance. Division Site File Curator, Suzanne Hoyal, incorporated the survey forms into the permanent record and assisted with the report editing and printing process.

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INTRODUCTION

The following report presents the results of a 1992-1993 West Tennessee Civil War military site survey conducted by the Tennessee Division of Archaeology. The study was the second regional survey completed by the Division that focussed on the Civil War activities of Federal and Confederate military troops. In 1988-1989, the first survey led to the identification of 132 previously unknown sites in Middle Tennessee (Smith, Prouty, and Nance 1990:19). The collection of data exceeded expectations and greatly expanded the state's historic archaeological data base. Due in part to the success of the first project, it seemed appropriate to initiate a second survey of Civil War site resources. The West Tennessee investigation of 89 Civil War military sites included the recording of 84 that were previously unrecorded.

Before the 1992-1993 survey, only five Civil War military sites had been recorded in the western part of the state. This lack of data was inconsistent with the total number of campaigns, battles, skirmishes, and other military actions that occurred in West Tennessee (Dyer 1908:595). In addition, many West Tennessee residents knew of Civil War military sites that were not recorded in the files at the Division of Archaeology.

Historic preservation goals and objectives necessitate the identification and recording of Tennessee's Civil War military sites. Development, farming, and erosion continue to destroy these sites, emphasizing the immediate need for site identification. In fact, construction activities recently destroyed several earthworks that the 1992-1993 survey had identified. In keeping with historic preservation goals and objectives, the knowledge gained from this and other surveys facilitates decisions regarding site evaluations for state and federal project reviews, mitigation of site destruction through archaeological excavation, and eligibility for the National Register of Historic Places.

As with the Middle Tennessee survey, the project team conducted initial research at the Tennessee State Library and Archives. The researchers also consulted other facilities including the Illinois State Historical Library, the University of Memphis Library, and various county records offices within the survey area. Local informants were another important source of information, and many of them assisted in locating sites during the survey.
GENERAL HISTORICAL INFORMATION CONCERNING 
THE CIVIL WAR IN WEST TENNESSEE

Early Confederate Military in West Tennessee

Several factors contributed to the strategic importance of Tennessee during the Civil War. Tennessee was the second most populated Confederate state with over 826,782 whites, 275,719 black slaves, and 7,300 free blacks. Tennessee led the seceded states in mule and pork production and supplied more horses, corn, and wheat than any other Confederate state east of the Mississippi (Greene and Gallacher 1992:94-95). Tennessee also held extensive deposits of iron, copper, salt peter, and lead (Miles 1991:16). Additionally, the rivers and railroad systems were crucial to the support of Federal logistical operations (Cupples 1987:19).

With its rich lowlands and numerous large plantations, West Tennessee was a strong pro-slavery, pro-Democratic, and pro-Confederate political subdivision (Smith et al. 1990:4). Nonetheless, a minority of pro-Union sympathizers in the counties of Carroll, Decatur, Henderson, Hardin, and Weakley voted against secession and eventually formed a regiment of Union cavalry (Lufkin 1988:169).

In December 1860, Governor Isham G. Harris requested a special session of Tennessee's General Assembly in Nashville where he persuaded state lawmakers to call a referendum on the question of state secession. In February 1861, the Tennessee electorate voted against secession from the Union, but voted in favor of reactivating the state militia. The act required all white male citizens between the ages of 18 and 45 to be formed into companies, regiments, brigades, and divisions. Governor Harris further authorized the purchase of 1,400 percussion muskets. These measures marked the preliminary formation of the Provisional Army of Tennessee (Bailey 1989:2).

During the early stages of secession in 1861, the Confederacy faced the problem of guarding the northern border of Tennessee and the southern border of Missouri in an area later known as the left flank of the Western Theater. The Confederacy quickly realized that West Tennessee was extremely vulnerable to Federal invasion due to its vast unprotected tributary system (Figure 1). As one author suggested, "Like daggers, the Tennessee, Cumberland and Mississippi rivers pointed to the heart of the south" (Higgs 1976:8). President Abraham Lincoln considered the recapture of the Mississippi and Tennessee rivers to be one of the war's major objectives, and this became a primary focus of Federal activities by the end of 1861 (Connelly 1990:16).

Memphis, in a vulnerable position on the bluffs of the Mississippi, became more assertive than Nashville in its secession sentiments. By early April 1861, Mayor
Figure 1. Map of West Tennessee as it appeared during the Civil War.
Richard D. Baugh and several leading citizens sent a resolution to newly named Confederate President Jefferson Davis stating that "... the city of Memphis has hereby seceded from the late United States, forever...and that she places herself under the government of the Confederate States and will respond to any call for aid from him." Another request called for artillery placement on the Memphis river bluff and on the Second Chickasaw Bluff 35 miles above Memphis near Randolph (OR, series 1, vol. 52, pt. 2, pp. 54-55).

On April 19, 1861, the Confederate Secretary of War, Leroy Walker, wired Governor Harris to recommend construction of defensive fortifications at Memphis and other strategic locations. The Chief of the Confederate Bureau of Engineers, Major Josiah Gorgas, recommended establishment of a major defensive position on the river above Memphis. In his opinion an entrenched camp of 30,000 troops with a line of fortifications and artillery on the banks of the Mississippi would prevent the passage of any Federal fleet (OR, series 1, vol. 52, pt. 2, p. 75). By April 23, 1861, Governor Harris ordered Colonel Marcus J. Wright of the 154th Tennessee Militia Regiment in Memphis to proceed with artillery to "some point above Memphis." The regiment steamed upriver to Randolph on the next day and began building Fort Wright, named in honor of the Colonel (Bailey 1989:6-7).

On April 26, 1861, Memphis newspapers reported that Federal authorities at Cairo captured the river boat, C. E. Hillman, en route from St. Louis to Nashville, carrying 200 tons of lead and black powder to be used for Tennessee's defense. The encounter with the Federal government and the loss of free navigation on the Mississippi enraged Tennesseans, driving the final wedge for Tennessee secession. On the 27th, Governor Harris met with Confederate government emissary, Henry W. Hilliard, in Nashville and expressed his hope that Tennessee would soon join the Confederacy (Horn 1965:17; Bailey 1989:8-9).

On May 6, 1861, the Tennessee legislature authorized Governor Harris to enter into a military league with the Confederate States of America, which then occurred on the 7th (Connelly 1979:4; Long 1971:71). Two days later came the selection of staff officers for the state military forces and appointments to financial and military boards. These organizations coordinated mobilization efforts until the troops were transferred to the authority of the Confederate States (Horn 1987:48; Tennessee Acts 1861:77).

Governor Harris placed all state military operations under General Gideon Johnson Pillow, charging him with the development of defenses for the Mississippi River (OR, series 1, vol. 52, Pt. 2, p. 72). Governor Harris also directed Adna Anderson, who was at that time Civil Engineer of the Edgefield & Kentucky Railroad, to select sites for fortifications on the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers. Construction proceeded at Fort Henry on the Tennessee, Fort Donelson on the Cumberland near Dover, Fort Harris on the Mississippi six miles above Memphis, Fort Wright 35 miles above Memphis, and Fort Pillow—known originally as Fort
Pillow was a successful attorney and planter whose Mexican War service granted him formidable credibility with the governor (Horn 1987:48). In an open letter published in the Memphis Daily Appeal, on April 20, 1861, Pillow stated that:

A good battery [of 24 and 32 pounder cannon] skilfully manned, at this point [Fort Wright] and sustained by a regiment or two of men could stop a flotilla of 25,000 federals and prevent them from descending one mile further, while the flood of the Hatchie River would prevent their landing above or taking Memphis in the rear or flank.

Pillow asked Confederate Secretary of War, Leroy Walker, to send an engineer to direct construction of defensive works. Captain Phillip Stockton, a West Point graduate, arrived in Memphis under orders to erect batteries on the Mississippi. By the end of April, construction was well underway on two batteries in Memphis and on works at Forts Harris and Wright. By mid-May General John Louis Taylor Sneed, successor to Adna Anderson, busily constructed batteries in Memphis. Construction of defensive works also began at Island No. 10 on the Mississippi River in the northwest corner of the state (OR, series 1, vol. 52, Pt. 2, pp. 68-69, 99; Horn 1987:48; Wright 1982:68; Bailey 1989:5).

Captain William D. Pickett, who later became Tennessee's senior engineering official, supervised a company of sappers and miners during the construction of Fort Harris six miles above Memphis. Officials determined that this fort was of little strategic importance and ordered the removal of all cannon. Only 159 soldiers remained at the fortification by the first of June (Bailey 1989:11).

On June 7, 1861, the Tennessee legislature adopted the Army Bill, which issued a call for 55,000 volunteers, appropriated $5,000,000, and authorized eight infantry regiments of the Provisional Army of Tennessee. On June 8, Tennesseans voted for secession by a majority of 104,913 to 47,238, with the state's eastern subdivision voting two to one against. On June 24, Governor Harris declared Tennessee "a free and independent government," and on July 22, 1861, Tennessee formally joined the Confederate States of America (Horn 1965:18, 1987:48; OR, series 1, vol. 52, Pt. 2, p. 90). On July 31, the Provisional Army of Tennessee officially entered Confederate service and became known as "The Army of Tennessee." This force remained the principal Confederate army west of the Appalachians until the end of the war in 1865 (Smith et al. 1990:6).

The diary of Private James Caswell Edenton indicates that during this same period of time his unit, the "Macon Greys" from Fayette County with Company "B" 13th Regiment Tennessee Volunteers, traveled from their training camp in Jackson by train to Memphis. The regiment steamed up the river to Randolph on June 7, where Fort Wright construction had begun in April. Private Edenton stated:
Figure 2. Map entitled "Ashport to Memphis" (Map No. 1577, Tennessee State Library and Archives). Based on the inscription, "Ft. Claiborn", the authors suggest a probable map date of June or July 1861. Colonel Patrick Cleburne (correct spelling) started the earthworks in June 1861 prior to the recall of his regiment to Arkansas the following month. Tennessee troops occupied the fort in July and immediately renamed it Fort Pillow (Wright 1982:68-69).
having cleared ground and pitched tents we proceeded to get something to eat ... and after were soon asleep ... [and on June 11] ... commenced work, that is clearing up and cutting down [trees] for miles around the fortifications ... received our arms today. They were the imported muskets [flintlocks altered to percussion] ... and the boys are much pleased (Edenton 1861:1).

Edenton's company was among 802 troops armed with the newer percussion muskets. Flintlock guns still armed the other 1,425 Fort Wright soldiers at the end of June (OR, vol. 52, pt. 2, pp. 122-123). Englishman William Howard Russell, a noted Crimean War correspondent, visited Fort Wright with General Pillow on June 18. Russell concluded that the works would not stop an invading river flotilla and that most of the enemy's ships would pass undamaged. He found the fort to be:

... a series of curious entrenchments, which are supposed to represent an entrenched camp ... In a word, they are so complicated that they would prove exceedingly troublesome to the troops engaged for their defense (Memphis Daily Appeal, August 2, 1861).

Meanwhile, Leonidas Polk urged Confederate President Davis to appoint their old West Point classmate, Albert Sidney Johnston, as commander of the Confederate Army's "Department No. 2," which included western Tennessee, eastern Arkansas, and the northern sections of Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama. President Davis asked Polk to assume command until Johnston arrived from the west coast. Commissioned as a major general in the Confederate Army, Polk established headquarters at Memphis (Horn 1987:48-49).

On July 4, 1861, General Pillow and his troops came under the command of Major General Leonidas Polk. Pillow, recently promoted to Brigadier General in the Confederate Army, arrived at Fort Wright with additional troops on the 26th of July. Almost immediately Polk ordered Pillow to advance to New Madrid, Missouri. Pillow arrived on the 28th with 6,000 men, some of whom had been part of the Fort Wright garrison (Bailey 1989:38; Parks 1962:171, 174-175).

By August 17, 1861, Major General Polk ordered the remaining regiments at Fort Wright to dismantle all guns and move to Island No. 10 and Fort Pillow, formerly named Fort Cleburne, at which point Fort Wright officially ceased to exist (Bailey 1989:39). Polk planned for the defense of the Mississippi as later described by his son, Captain William M. Polk:

... Columbus, [Kentucky] the advanced and most important point, was to be most thoroughly fortified. The lines in the rear, covering the batteries commanding the river, were to be so constructed as to permit their being held by a fraction of his force, the larger portion remaining free to operate in the open field. Island No. 10 was to be fortified as a reserve to Columbus; New Madrid to be fortified so as to prevent the
enemy getting possession of the Missouri shore at that point, and thus obstructing river navigation below No. 10; while Fort Pillow was to form the last stronghold in the chain (Horn 1987:51-52).

The Confederate defenses at New Madrid were to provide access into Missouri and protect the northwest corridor of Tennessee from a river invasion. Several days after General Pillow's arrival in New Madrid construction began on the fortifications, but Pillow soon expressed serious reservations regarding their defensibility. To calm Pillow's objections, General Polk sent his engineer, Captain A. B. Gray, to survey and fortify Island No. 10 on the Mississippi River (Wright 1982:69-70).

Polk and Pillow intended to secure Columbus, Kentucky, which they believed was the natural key to the South's defense of the Mississippi. In addition to river defenses, Polk ordered two infantry regiments to camp near the Kentucky border at Union City, Tennessee, to facilitate the move on Columbus when the time was right (Horn 1987:51).

The Federal Invasion of Kentucky and West Tennessee

General John C. Fremont, commander of the Federal forces in the Western Theater, established a concentration of troops at Cairo, Illinois, where the Ohio and Mississippi rivers join. These troops were poised to invade the South either by the Mississippi or up the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers. In charge of these troops and the construction of a fleet of river gunboats was heretofore unknown Brigadier General Ulysses S. Grant (Ketchum 1960:114).

On September 2, 1861, Grant dispatched a land and naval force to occupy Belmont, Missouri. Southern intelligence reports indicated that the Federals were prepared to seize Columbus, Kentucky, situated directly across the river from Belmont (OR, vol. 4, p.181). On September 3, to counter the Federal movement, General Polk sent General Pillow's forces into Hickman, Kentucky, and by the 4th they occupied Columbus. This action ended Kentucky's neutrality. General Grant answered the advance by seizing Paducah, Kentucky, which allowed control of the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers, and provided a direct route to Nashville, northern Mississippi and Alabama (Winchester 1990:69).

After a grueling three-month trek from the west coast, Albert Sidney Johnston arrived in Richmond, Virginia, on September 5, 1861. There he accepted commission as a full general in the Confederate Army, replacing Major General Polk as commander of "Department No. 2" (Horn 1987:54). Both armies admired Johnston and considered him one of the ablest of professional soldiers to join the Confederacy (Ketchum 1960:114). General William Tecumseh Sherman called Albert Sidney Johnston "a real general," and Grant acknowledged that Johnston's fellow officers deemed him "the most formidable man that the Confederacy would produce" (Winchester 1990:70).
General A. S. Johnston faced the immense task of holding a defensive line from the mountains of eastern Kentucky and Tennessee to the Kansas boundary (Horn 1987:55). Making the best of materials at hand, the General established a strong defensive garrison of 20,000 men and heavy siege guns to control the Mississippi River from the high bluffs at Columbus, Kentucky. From here a defensive line extended east through Kentucky, with 25,000 men stationed in Bowling Green and a smaller contingent located on the upper Cumberland River near the Tennessee border (Ketchum 1960:114). A fortified camp at Cumberland Gap protected northeast Tennessee from possible attack (Horn 1965:25).

On November 6, 1861, General Grant transported 3,114 of his troops down the Mississippi from Cairo to attack a force of 2,700 Confederate infantrymen encamped across the river from Columbus at Belmont, Missouri (Figure 1). On the 7th after several hours of fighting the routed Confederates scattered and took refuge on the banks of the river. The Federals temporarily commanded the Belmont battlefield but soon heavy Confederate artillery fire plunged from the Columbus bluffs. At the same time fresh Confederate reinforcements landed in support and attacked the Federal flank, sending them in full retreat to their waiting transports. Grant himself narrowly escaped as the boats hurriedly withdrew (Long 1982:142; Horn 1987:64-65; Winchester 1990:69-70). Throughout the South the Confederates celebrated the battle as a brilliant victory. On the other hand, Grant stated in his official report that his successful expedition accomplished two objectives, "the enemy gave up all ideas of detaching troops from Columbus" and the "National troops acquired a confidence in themselves" that built morale for the battles to come (Long 1982:143). Grant later admitted that "Belmont was severely criticized in the North as a wholly unnecessary battle, barren of results" (Long 1982:144).

River Fortifications

Confederate engineer, Captain A. B Gray, had addressed Pillow's concerns regarding protection of the northwest corridor. Gray's defense of Island No. 10 included a series of earthworks on the island, the bastioned Fort Leonidas on the shore of the Tennessee mainland, and the V-shaped Fort Redan a mile upriver (Wright 1982:70). A horse-drawn artillery unit aided the defense against enemy troop landings along the banks of the Mississippi. Construction plans for the island included a redoubt and a square-shaped earthenwork that could accommodate 1,000 soldiers (OR, vol. 3, pp. 651-652). However, after viewing the Island No. 10 defenses General Pillow reported that the earthworks on the island would flood and he requested the construction of new batteries on higher ground (Wright 1982:72).

By December 1861, below the "impregnable" parapets of Columbus and Island No. 10, construction of Fort Pillow neared completion (OR, vol. 52, pt. 2, p. 221). During the preceding June, Colonel Patrick Ronayne Cleburne had chosen this location as a strategic position for guarding the Mississippi River. Cleburne's First Arkansas Regiment partially completed a line of entrenchments and embrasures.
and named the fort in honor of Cleburne (Purdue and Purdue 1987:81). During the first week of July the Arkansas troops received orders to pull from position and return to duty in their own state. Tennessee troops soon occupied the post and renamed it Fort Pillow in honor of their commanding general (Bailey 1989:25).

Although General Pillow ordered the earlier construction of Fort Pillow's main water batteries, Captain Montgomery Lynch and Mr. D. Winter, a civilian engineer from Memphis, supervised construction of more than four miles of earthworks after General Leonidas Polk had assumed temporary command (Mainfort 1986:74; Horn 1987:48). Then early in 1862, Captain Lynch of the Confederate States Corps of Engineers constructed additional detached earthworks within the 1861 fortifications (Mainfort 1986:74,76). A large predominate slave work force arrived by steamer from Mississippi and Arkansas to assist Captain Lynch (Wright 1982:69, 78).

Expressing concern about river defenses on the Tennessee and Cumberland, General Albert Sidney Johnston wrote to Adjutant General Cooper in Richmond predicting a Federal attempt to capture Nashville by taking Forts Henry and Donelson. He further noted that his command of 14,000 men faced 40,000 Federals. Johnston stated that "... our people do not comprehend the magnitude of the danger that threatens, ... all the resources of the Confederacy are now needed for the defense of Tennessee" (Horn 1987:80).

Armies on the Move

Early in 1862, U. S. General Fremont relinquished command to a professional soldier, Major General H. W. Halleck, whose control extended to the Cumberland River. Brigadier General Don Carlos Buell commanded Federal forces in Kentucky to the east. Although both of the Federal generals commanded more troops than Confederate General Albert Sidney Johnston, the cautious Buell was reluctant to move his troops before all preparations had been made. Their lack of coordination caused delays and lost opportunities (Ketchum 1960:115). Eventually Federal armies began to move. General Buell's forces completely routed Confederate troops at Mill Springs, Kentucky. The engagement destroyed General A. S. Johnston's eastern defensive line (Ketchum 1960:115).

On February 6, 1862, Grant's combined force of 17,000 Federal infantrymen and Admiral Andrew Hull Foote's naval gunboats launched their offensive on the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers. The Union fleet passed the abandoned Confederate Fort Heiman on the Kentucky shore and engaged Confederate artillery at Fort Henry (Smith et al. 1990:7). Floodwaters enabled the fleet to close within several hundred feet of the parapets and destroy most of Fort Henry's cannon with gunboat fire. In spite of heavy damage also sustained by the Federal fleet, the Confederates surrendered the fort after one hour of bombardment (Wright 1982:89).
General A. S. Johnston notified his staff that the loss of Fort Henry to the
Federals threatened Fort Donelson and that "...preparations should at once be
made for the removal of this army to Nashville" (OR series 1, vol. 7, p. 861).
General Johnston no longer believed that the river forts could withstand Federal
naval flotilla bombardment. He stated, "The slight resistance at Fort Henry
indicates that the best open earthworks are not reliable to meet successfully a
vigorous attack of iron-clad gunboats" (OR, vol. 7, p. 863). On February 7,
Johnston ordered abandonment of the defenses in Bowling Green, sent 15,000 men
to defend Fort Donelson, and marched the rest to Nashville (OR, vol. 7, p. 864;
Ketchum 1960:115).

On February 12 and 13, Grant marched troops from Fort Henry to surround Fort
Donelson. The next day Commodore Foote's gunboats moved close to the fort and
pounded it point blank. Although this tactic worked well for the Federals at Fort
Henry, the Confederates at Fort Donelson fired upon the gunboats with accuracy,
"shredding the little fleet" (Winchester 1990:74). This proved however to be a
shallow victory. On the 16th after three days of intense infantry fighting, an
estimated 7,000 to 12,000 Fort Donelson Confederates surrendered
unconditionally. Hereafter, the General became known as "Unconditional Surrender
Grant." Confederate General Pillow and thousands of his troops fled from the fort
and escaped by crossing the river, and a cavalry force under Lieutenant Colonel
Nathan Bedford Forrest also escaped the fort, eluding capture (Horn 1987:97;
Winchester 1990:74).

The situation forced Confederate General Albert Sidney Johnston to make a
general retreat including a withdrawal of the main body of troops from Columbus,
Kentucky, which left "a sufficient garrison...for the purpose of making a desperate
defense of the river at that point." Island No. 10 and Fort Pillow on the Mississippi
were to be "defended to the last extremity" (Horn 1987:85). Confederate General P.
G. T. Beauregard from Virginia, now Johnston's second in command, held forces in
readiness in case the Federals attacked Memphis or northern Mississippi (Horn
1987:109). With the loss of Fort Donelson, General Johnston wired Beauregard in

Preparing for a New Offensive

Upon the loss of Forts Henry and Donelson the entire upper south lay open and
exposed (Higgs 1976:8). Only Fort Defiance on the Cumberland at Clarksville
stood between the Federal fleet and defenseless Nashville. When Clarksville
surrendered without a shot fired, General A. S. Johnston decided that "the situation
left me no alternative but to evacuate Nashville or sacrifice the Army" (OR, series 1,
vol. 7, p. 426). During the evacuation the presence of Forrest and his troops curbed
panic in the local population. Forrest was able to remove large quantities of military
stores while Governor Harris and the Tennessee legislature departed by train for
Memphis, where state government remained until Memphis surrendered to Federal
gunboats in June 1862 (Smith et al. 1990:8).
Corinth, Mississippi, that "the separation of our armies is for the present complete" (Roman 1884:233; Horn 1987:109).

A newly established line of Confederate defenses ran from northwestern Alabama and northeastern Mississippi, across the width of Tennessee through Jackson, Humboldt, and Union City on the Kentucky border, then west to Island No. 10, New Madrid, and southeastern Missouri. Near the right terminus of the new line Corinth and Iuka held a strong body of troops in north Mississippi (Horn 1989:110). Near the western end of the line, on March 2, 1862, General Beauregard totally abandoned Columbus after much criticism from General Polk. From Columbus Beauregard sent 8,000 men, several trainloads of ammunition, and over a hundred pieces of artillery to defend Island No. 10, New Madrid, and Fort Pillow. These defenses were the only block against the Federal flotilla's approach to Memphis (Sword 1983:79-80).

The removal of Columbus defenses prompted a reevaluation of other Confederate defensive capabilities (Mainfort 1986:76). Chief Engineer Major Jeremy Gilmer determined that the long line of infantry earthworks at Fort Pillow, which would require 15,000 to 20,000 men for defense, should be reduced by placement of a smaller set of detached works to the rear of the original line. Upon completion of the new earthworks a garrison of 3,000 troops manned the fort (ORN, vol. 22, p. 839; Wright 1982:108; Horn 1987:111). Also exposed to Federal attack were the undermanned Confederate river defenses at New Madrid. An aggregate of 8,500 men was to be divided between Island No. 10 and the New Madrid earthworks (Horn 1987:144).

While Generals Grant and Buell moved toward Pittsburg Landing on the Tennessee River to threaten General A. S. Johnston's Confederate forces in Corinth, General Halleck sent General Pope down the west side of the Mississippi into Missouri. On March 3, 1862, Pope's 25,000 men with four heavy siege guns approached New Madrid, which Halleck considered to be the weakest position of the New Madrid-Island No. 10 complex (Wright 1989:104-105). Light skirmishing ensued for a week until Pope ordered a major attack on March 12. Seeing no possibility of defending his position against Pope's superior numbers, Confederate General John Porter McCown evacuated New Madrid on the night of March 13. A portion of his troops transferred to Island No. 10, others crossed the river into Tennessee, and all unmounted guns, supplies and boats went to Fort Pillow (Horn 1987:144). General Beauregard later denounced this episode as "...the poorest defense made by any fortified post during the whole course of the war" (Roman 1884,1:358). General McCown had been ordered to defend his position at all hazards, and his unsanctioned retreat led to his replacement by General W. W. Mackall (OR., series 1, vol. 8, pp. 126-129, 804).

On the morning of March 15, 1862, commanding Flag Officer A. H. Foote and the U. S. Naval flotilla arrived in the vicinity of Island No. 10. The men saw a chain of forts extending approximately four miles along the crescent-shaped shore with
the Confederate camps in the rear. On the 17th an attack on the upper battery by Federal iron-clads and mortar-boats silenced all but one of the guns.

Between March 17 and April 4, 1862, long-range naval bombardment did little damage to other Confederate batteries. Fearing a potential loss of his gunboats in an attempt to run the batteries, Admiral Foote found a route through the swamps north of Island No. 10 (Walke 1956, I:439). For the next 19 days engineers cut and removed heavy timbers in the swamp to a depth of 4 1/2 feet below water level. On April 4, completion of a canal 12 miles long and 50 feet wide provided an opening into the Mississippi River adjacent to New Madrid and below Island No. 10. However, by this time the river level had fallen and, as a result, the canal was too shallow for the heavy gunboats to pass (Wright 1982:106).

Under the continued insistence of General Pope, Commodore Foote reluctantly ordered two gunboats to the batteries. On the night of April 4, the Carondelet passed Island No. 10 unobserved and on the 6th the Pittsburg also proceeded without incident (Walke 1956, I: 442-443). On April 7, General Pope placed his Federals across the narrow ground between Tiptonville and Reelfoot Lake, closing off the escape route of the Confederates. Instead of engaging the enemy, General Mackall surrendered his small force of 7,000 men along with 123 pieces of heavy siege artillery and 35 smaller field pieces (OR, vol. 8, pp. 89-90; ORN, vol. 22, pp. 731-733). General Pope's tactic of outflanking and attacking heavily fortified positions in the rear would prove to be the best future strategy (Wright 1982:107).

The evacuation of New Madrid and the surrender of Island No. 10 left only Fort Pillow on the defense line at the Mississippi. The troop strength at Fort Pillow did not meet the demands of the fort's design, nevertheless, General Beauregard opposed a commitment of large forces to fortified positions in which a siege would force ultimate surrender. He believed that a small garrison of 3,000 to 5,000 men could delay the enemy for several weeks while the majority of his forces remained available for field operations. The plan gave little hope for holding the river defenses unless sufficient reinforcements could be mustered for a field victory or for relief of the fort's garrison (Nichols, 1957:55). The situation compelled Beauregard to maintain a field army at the expense of his river defenses.

Generals A. S. Johnston and P. G. T. Beauregard had now joined forces at Corinth just below the Tennessee border where two vital railroad lines intersected. This intersection of the Memphis & Charleston and the Mobile & Ohio railroads created a staging ground for fresh troops. Major General Braxton Bragg's army of 10,000 from Florida, Brigadier General Daniel Ruggles' 5,000 men, and the combined forces of Johnston and Beauregard totaled 40-50,000 soldiers. From Corinth, General Johnston and his Confederate Army of the West would launch their first major offensive move (Ketchum 1960:115; Winchester 1990:75).
The Battle That Shocked a Nation

As Island No. 1 surrendered, General A. S. Johnston moved his reorganized army of 40,000 to attack Grant's 37,000 troops encamped at Pittsburg Landing, Tennessee (Shiloh). In a surprise attack on the morning of April 6, 1862, the Confederates gained an early success, but momentum ceased after the mortal wounding of Albert Sidney Johnston. The Confederate command shifted to General Beauregard during the night. Buell's fresh Federal troops reinforced Grant's beleaguered forces, and by daybreak on April 7, 45,000 Federals counterattacked 20,000 battle-worn Confederates. Grant's attack regained all the ground lost on the previous day. After an attempt by Beauregard to rally his troops at Shiloh Church, he withdrew his army from the field. The Federals gave little attention to pursuit of the Confederates, and the rear guard cavalry action of Colonel Nathan Bedford Forrest enabled Beauregard's forces to withdraw toward Corinth with a good portion of their materials and wounded (Horn 1977:7, Sword 1983:115-140, McDonough 1977:152-153). Confederate General Patrick Cleburne later said of the Battle of Shiloh, "It was a battle gallantly won and stupidly lost" (Purdue 1973:119).

Shiloh was the first large scale battle of the Civil War, and the magnitude of the slaughter, 23,000 casualties, horrified the civilians of both the north and south (Greene and Gallagher 1992:100-107). Shiloh was also a battle the Confederacy could not afford to lose. The strategic objectives had been to restore the balance of power in the west, to establish the Confederate frontier in Kentucky, and to save the Mississippi Valley. Failure to achieve those objectives placed the western flank of the Confederacy in jeopardy (Sword 1983:438).

After the Battle of Shiloh, outnumbered Confederate troops retreated southward to Corinth, Mississippi. Corinth had become a strategic position for the Confederacy due to the juncture of the Memphis & Charleston and Mobile & Ohio railroads. These transportation routes supplied essential provisions and were vital to the communication needs of the southern armies (Wright 1982:113).

Major General Halleck relieved General Grant as commanding officer and began a month-long Federal advance toward Corinth. Movement slowed as troops constructed intermittent entrenchments for almost 20 miles between Shiloh and Corinth (Wright 1982:115). Lucius Barber, a Federal soldier in the 15th Illinois Volunteer Regiment stated:

We kept hitching along now from one-fourth to two miles a day, generally marching it in the evening. Before going to rest we built earthworks in front of the regiment. Each regiment was required to do this before going into camp. Two hours was sufficient for us to throw up breast-works that would stand the test of light artillery...When the army came to a strong position, they would throw up strong works, irregular in shape, and commanding every possible position...The
whole intervening space between us and the landing was one continual series of fortifications (Barber 1894:62, 63).

The earthworks were the "most extraordinary display of entrenchments, under offensive conditions witnessed in the entire Civil War" (Hagerman 1988:173). By May 30, 1862, an abandoned Corinth was in Federal hands. General Braxton Bragg, new commander of the Confederate Army of Tennessee, relocated the main body of troops to Chattanooga in July (Horn 1977:11).

The defeat at Shiloh and the loss of the rail head at Corinth had immediate and far-reaching consequences. Fort Pillow was rendered untenable, resulting in the withdrawal of all but a few hundred men from the fort by June 1, 1862 (Mainfort 1986:76, Horn 1987:153). On June 4, General Beauregard ordered Confederate General Villepique to move the Fort Pillow garrison to Grenada, Mississippi, leaving behind nineteen pieces of artillery (Mainfort 1986:76). On June 5, a Union reconnaissance party reached Fort Pillow and found the casements, magazines, and breastworks blown to bits (Walke 1956:1:449).

The Confederate loss of Columbus, New Madrid, the Island No. 10 complex, and Fort Pillow river defenses left Memphis virtually undefended (Wright 1982:112). On June 6, 1862, Federal gunboats at Memphis clashed with a small defensive fleet of eight Confederate rams led by J. E. Montgomery. The city surrendered after a brisk one-sided naval battle that destroyed the southern flotilla (Horn 1987:153, Nichols 1957:56). The actions of the Federal flotilla led to the opening of the Mississippi River from Cairo to Memphis and gave the Union forces complete control of West Tennessee (Walke 1956:452, Ellet 1956:453-459).

The loss of Memphis left Vicksburg, Mississippi, as the last Confederate stronghold on the river. Vicksburg faced imminent starvation during a 47-day siege and surrendered to Federal armies in July 1863 (Blay 1958:176-181). The total loss of the river successfully split the Confederacy, which allowed Union flotillas to easily block the flow of Confederate supplies on the river, including grains and other food products from the Trans-Mississippi region (Higgs 1976:8).

Further Gains and Losses

West Tennessee remained relatively quiet until December 11, 1862, when General Nathan Bedford Forrest's brigade of four depleted regiments and a four-gun artillery battery departed from Columbia on a raid into West Tennessee. On the 15th the poorly equipped cavalymen crossed the Tennessee River near Clifton. Within two days they had captured Lexington and had taken 150 prisoners, 300 Sharps rifles, and ammunition. Of special pride to Forrest was the capture of two cannon (three-inch ordnance rifles) that remained with him until the end of the war (Horn 1987:194, Wyeth 1959:97).
Moving west, on December 19, 1862, General Forrest initiated a feint attack on Jackson near Salem cemetery where he encountered strong Federal resistance. He proceeded north along the Mobile & Ohio Railroad to Trenton and Humboldt (Figure 1), capturing both posts and destroying stockades and garrison stores (Snead 1956, III: 452). From Trenton, Forrest continued north to capture Union City near the Kentucky border and on December 23 destroyed bridges and trestling as far north as Moscow, Kentucky. He then moved back into Tennessee, followed the rail to McKenzie Station, and headed south to Lexington (Wyeth 1959: 100-102). Strengthened Union forces moved to cut off Forrest's retreat. Forrest turned to fight his pursuers at Parker's Crossroads near Huntington. Following this desperate engagement he withdrew into Middle Tennessee, crossing the Tennessee River at Clifton on January 2, 1863 (Snead 1956, III: 452, Wyeth 1975: 125-136).

In less than three weeks Forrest had captured or killed 2,500 men, and had taken ten cannon, 10,000 rifles, and a million rounds of ammunition. Equally important, he destroyed fifty trestles along the Mobile & Ohio Railroad (Horn 1987: 1194-1195). Forrest's raid broke Grant's lines of communication and supplies, which forced him to abandon the advance into Mississippi and to delay General William Tecumseh Sherman's expedition to Vicksburg (Snead 1956, III: 451-452, Horn 1987: 194). Grant relinquished the railroad as his chief supply line in West Tennessee and relied instead on the Mississippi River for transportation of military provisions (Lytle 1984: 139).

In Middle Tennessee during the last days of 1862, the Battle of Stones River near Murfreesboro forced General Braxton Bragg's Confederate Army to withdraw to the Shelbyville-Wartrace-Tullahoma area where good defensive positions facilitated the army's reorganization. By mid-summer in 1863, U. S. General Rosecrans moved out of Murfreesboro and flanked Bragg's army, forcing withdrawal to Chattanooga (Smith et al. 1990: 10-12).

At the Battle of Chickamauga in September 1863, General Bragg's Confederates routed General Rosecrans' army and forced a Federal withdrawal to Chattanooga where they neared starvation. General Grant replaced General Rosecrans and in November 1863, at Missionary Ridge near Chattanooga, he defeated Bragg's troops forcing their retreat to Dalton, Georgia. Here General Joseph E. Johnston replaced Braxton Bragg as commander of the Army of Tennessee (Horn 1987: 298-340).

Forrest and His Next Field of Duty

Following the military engagements in the Chattanooga area, Confederate raiding, led by General Forrest, was the only action in Tennessee for much of the next year (Smith et al. 1990: 12). In November 1863, Forrest asked to be relieved of his command with the Army of Tennessee and requested a new field of duty in northern Mississippi and western Tennessee (Wyeth 1959: 249-251). Forrest's main objective was to break through the strong line of Federal troops along the
east-west Memphis & Charleston Railroad and penetrate into West Tennessee. He planned to establish headquarters near Jackson, Tennessee, where he would recruit an army by calling for volunteers or, if necessary, by imposing conscription (Wyeth 1959:251).

On December 1, 1863, General Forrest's small battalion of 450 men and two cannon left Ripley, Mississippi. Forrest arrived in Jackson by December 6 where he assembled a force of about 3,500 and headed southwest. Several successful raids gained supplies and attracted new recruits before he crossed back into the relative security of Mississippi on the last day of December (Wyeth 1959:249-266). In January 1864, a northern newspaper correspondent writing from Memphis described Forrest's raids:

Forrest, with less than 4,000 men has moved right through the Sixteenth Army Corps, has passed within nine miles of Memphis, carried off a hundred wagons, two hundred beef cattle, three thousand conscripts and innumerable stores; torn up railroad tracks, destroyed telegraph wires, burned and sacked towns ... and all in the face of ten thousand men (Wyeth 1959:256-266).

In March 1864, the Confederate government decided that the accomplishments of Forrest in West Tennessee might be duplicated in Kentucky (Wyeth 1959:299). Forrest and a large force advanced from Tupelo, Mississippi, into western Tennessee (Speed 1956,IV:415). During this period Union forces occupied Fort Pillow as a recruiting post, manned by the Thirteenth Tennessee (Federal) Cavalry and several detachments of black artillerists. On April 12, Forrest's command arrived from Jackson to storm and capture the fort in one of the most controversial battles of the Civil War (Mainfort 1986:76-77). The Union commanders refused two demands for surrender. During the final Confederate attack Union troops broke rank and fled down the bluff to the river bank. There was never a formal surrender of the fort or troops, but some of Forrest's men were later charged with murdering black prisoners after overrunning the fort (Waring 1956:418-419, Wyeth 1959:299-341, Mainfort 1980:3-4).

In the summer of 1864, Federal troops crossed Tennessee into Georgia as they moved toward Atlanta. General William T. Sherman ordered Major General Andrew J. Smith to locate and destroy the forces of General Forrest, who had returned to Mississippi and were a constant threat to the 500-mile Federal supply line (Mallinson 1984:7,11). In a June 1864 letter addressed to Edwin M. Stanton, the U.S. Secretary of War, Sherman stated that he intended to:

Go out and follow Forrest to the death if it cost 10,000 lives and breaks the treasury. There will never be peace in Tennessee until Forrest is dead (OR, vol 38, pt. 4, p. 480).
By August 1864, General Smith and a Federal army of 20,000 infantry, 3,700 cavalrymen, and 38 pieces of artillery pursued Forrest's 5,000 cavalrymen. Unable to fight head-on with this overwhelming force, Forrest out-maneuvered them and planned a daring attack on Memphis where he would be least expected (Mallinson 1984:7-8).

The Memphis Raid

Memphis became a major supply center after its capture by the Federal flotilla in 1862. Naval gunboats heavily fortified the city; extensive earthworks at Fort Pickering commanded the river bluffs just to the south; cavalry and infantry regiments surrounded the town. Many high ranking officers quartered in Memphis had complete confidence in the defenses (Mallinson 1984:7-8).

On August 18, 1864, 2,000 of Forrest's cavalry and Captain John W. Morton's Tennessee battery departed from Oxford in Mississippi on one of Forrest's most daring raids. The physical strain of marching on muddy roads in heavy rain caused Forrest to lose 500 horses and two cannon before reaching Hernando, Mississippi, 25 miles south of Memphis. Scouts confirmed the presence in Memphis of the three Federal generals that Forrest planned to capture (Wyeth 1959:412). He also hoped to draw General Smith's forces out of Mississippi (Mallinson 1984:9).

On August 21, the Confederate general's younger brother, Captain William H. Forrest, rode through a thick fog into Memphis with ten scouts to surprise and capture three groups of Union pickets. Hearing the firing of shots, Forrest ordered his bugler to sound the charge. He took the most direct route to the quarters of the three generals, but all either slept elsewhere or narrowly escaped capture. Colonel Jesse Forrest, another younger brother of the general, attempted to locate U. S. General Cadwallader C. Washburn, but the general had fled to Fort Pickering in his night shirt. General Forrest later received Washburn's private papers and uniform as a trophy. General Ralph A. Buckland also escaped to organize the Federal defenses, and by 10:00 the next morning the Confederates retreated during hand-to-hand combat. Forrest halted a mile out of town and sent a flag of truce to General Washburn, offering to exchange prisoners; Washburn refused (Mallinson 1984:10). Washburn sent a cable to General Smith in Mississippi stating that, "You will at once order all your cavalry to move to intercept them (Forrest) ... They must be cut off and caught. Move rapidly and spare not horse flesh" (Wyeth 1959:420). Due to the vague nature of the message General Smith could not locate the Confederates in time to stop Forrest's return to Grenada, Mississippi.

During the raid on Memphis Forrest lost only 35 men and took almost 600 prisoners. His raid surprised and demoralized the Federal troops who occupied Memphis and resulted in the withdrawal of General Smith from Mississippi (Horn 1961:8). Confederate Department Commander, General D. H. Maury, sent congratulations stating, "You have again saved Mississippi" (Mallinson 1984:11).
Cavalrymen and Gunboats--The Johnsonville Campaign

Following the fall of Atlanta to Sherman's forces in September 1864, the Army of Tennessee, now under the command of General John Bell Hood, fought its way from Georgia to Tennessee (Smith et al. 1990:13). Hood planned to invade Middle Tennessee with the intention of moving rapidly north and capturing or bypassing Nashville. He hoped to move on to Louisville, Kentucky, or perhaps Cincinnati, thereby putting a wedge into the middle west that would hopefully draw Sherman out of Georgia (Horn 1987:377-384). Succeeding in this, he might then cross the Cumberland Mountains and attack Grant's army while they battled against General Robert E. Lee's forces near Richmond, Virginia (Ketchum 1960: 546). But instead of pursuing Hood, General Sherman began his "March to the Sea" and sent General George H. Thomas to Nashville with a force of 50,000 to secure Middle Tennessee (Smith et al. 1990:13).

Forrest realized that Hood's imminent invasion of Middle Tennessee would cause the Federals to concentrate their forces around Nashville, weakening the garrison at Memphis and other West Tennessee locations. With this in mind Forrest decided that a raid back into West Tennessee would "... enable me to get out a considerable amount of stock and accomplish very important results" (Wyeth 1959:453). By early October 1864, Forrest's recuperating forces received orders to move back into West Tennessee in order to interrupt Federal navigation on the Tennessee River and destroy the immense stores at Johnsonville (Horn 1965:273,274).

Forrest left Corinth on October 21, 1864, and moved north to establish headquarters at Jackson, Tennessee. Five hundred additional troops reinforced his 3,000 sick battle-weary men. Forrest sent his forces north to establish artillery positions at Paris Landing on the Tennessee River and across the Kentucky border at Fort Heiman (Wyeth 1959:456).

Forrest arrived at Paris Landing on the morning of October 29, 1864, with his presence unknown to Federal forces. By judicious placement of artillery along the west bank of the Tennessee River, Forrest's troops captured the Federal gunboat Undine. Armed with eight twenty-four pounder brass Howitzers, the Undine was one of the largest boats of her class on the river (Horn 1965:274,275). The troops also captured three transports, two of which were stripped of their cargo and burned. Confederate cavalry volunteers operated the Undine and remaining transport until they were recaptured or destroyed (Smith et al. 1990:13).

During the diversion with the captured boats, Forrest maneuvered ten pieces of artillery twenty miles south of Paris Landing and placed them on a key bluff overlooking the entire Johnsonville depot. The Confederates began to bombard the Federal fleet and facilities on the east bank of the river at 2:00 in the afternoon on November 4, 1864. The Federal garrison took cover in its lower redoubt and returned fire with little effect. Within two hours most of the ships and barges were
ablaze and the shore commanders set fire to the remaining stores to keep them from being captured (Higgs 1976:85; Garret 1963:106; Williams and Humphreys 1965: 18, 22-24). Four gunboats, fourteen steamboats, seventeen barges, and 75,000 to 120,000 tons of quartermasters stores had been destroyed by sunset, and approximately 150 Federals had been taken prisoner. Estimates of damage range from two to six million dollars (Higgs 1976:87, 88). Forrest's losses were two killed and nine wounded (Garrett 1963:108).

Following the engagement at Johnsonville, General Beauregard ordered Forrest and his entire command to join General John B. Hood's forces in Middle Tennessee (Horn 1965:275). This movement of Forrest's troops ended virtually all military activity in West Tennessee.

The Final Phase

On November 18, 1864, General Forrest accepted command of the entire cavalry for the Army of Tennessee (Wyeth 1959:471). General John Bell Hood and the Army of Tennessee met disastrous defeats at the Battles of Franklin and Nashville in November and December (Smith et al. 1990:13-17). On December 28, the remains of a decimated Confederate army crossed the Tennessee River on its southward retreat. Forrest's cavalry corps conducted a masterful rear guard action to protect General Hood's retreat. By January 10, 1865, General Hood's troops were in winter quarters at Tupelo, Mississippi, where Hood requested to be relieved of his command. Forrest and his cavalry were ordered to move to Corinth, Mississippi. Forrest, now a Lieutenant General, received command of the District of Mississippi and all the cavalry between the Chattahoochee and Mississippi rivers (Horn 1987:420-421; 1961:8).

On March 22, 1865, Major General James Harrison Wilson and his Federal cavalry corps of 27,000 men crossed the Tennessee River in pursuit of Forrest's depleted forces. On March 31, Wilson's well-equipped cavalry struck Forrest's troops near Montevallo, Alabama (Wyeth 1959:517). After a three-day 60-mile running battle, Forrest broke contact with the Federal cavalry on April 3 (Horn 1961:9). By April 15, he had established headquarters in Gainsville, Alabama.

The Army of Tennessee, commanded by General Joseph E. Johnston, moved from their winter quarters in Mississippi to North Carolina. General Johnston surrendered on April 26, 1865, after participating in the Battle of Bentonville (Horn 1961:8). On May 6, Forrest heard the news of General Lee's surrender in Virginia. On May 9, the few thousand men under Forrest's command could hold out no longer and surrendered as a part of Lieutenant General Taylor's army at Gainsville. This was the last Confederate surrender east of the Mississippi River (Wyeth 1959:510-540).
THE WEST TENNESSEE SURVEY

The Division of Archaeology initiated a thematic survey of West Tennessee Civil War military sites in October 1992. The survey began with preliminary research and contact with local informants to obtain information from which to develop a field reconnaissance strategy. Field investigations recorded individual sites, many representing only the surviving portions of larger complex areas such as battlefields or fortified towns. This progression from archival research and informant contact to the development of a field strategy and the recording of individual sites was a successful data recovery technique for this and other thematic surveys conducted by the Division of Archaeology (Smith and Rogers 1979; Smith et al. 1988; Smith et al. 1990). Research continued throughout the project, contributing to the fieldwork and the synthesis of data.

Preliminary research at the Tennessee State Library and Archives and local informants enabled the survey team to tentatively identify possible Civil War sites on 7.5 minute topographic maps. The team then consulted county tax records for names of land owners to contact prior to field reconnaissance. All but two owners granted permission for on-site investigations. During site inspections the survey team confirmed site locations, evaluated site conditions, mapped extant remains, drew site sketches, and took black and white area photographs and color slides.

In conjunction with the West Tennessee survey, there were limited archaeological excavations at the sites of the Battle of Johnsonville (Irion and Beard 1993) and the Battle of Parker's Crossroads (see Battlefields, p. 41). Field reconnaissance of the remaining sites did not include excavations, which often constrained site definitions and boundary determinations. Archival documentation aided in the determination of site boundaries in the field. The survey team also relied on informant knowledge to determine spatial dimensions or site components, and compared field data with relevant literature on historic military tactics and engineering procedures (Mahan 1836). In the absence of excavation, a subjective approach was often the only means available for making site assessments. For purposes of cultural resource management, a subjective identification of perhaps only partial sites of Civil War military activities is preferrable to an absence of recorded information.

Information collected during the West Tennessee survey adds to a body of knowledge that is of interest to researchers and the general public. The project included the recording of field and archival data onto standard information forms. Each permanent site record includes historical background, a site description, and other pertinent information. Each newly recorded site received a state site number upon incorporation into the permanent statewide site survey record maintained by the Division of Archaeology. The project also considered the potential eligibility of individual sites for listing on the National Register of Historic Places. Results of the various project activities are the substance of this section of the report.
Component Definitions and Presentation of Findings

The West Tennessee project added 84 Civil War military sites to the permanent statewide site survey record. For five previously recorded sites, the project also included an assessment of current site conditions and accuracy of prior boundary determinations. These sites include 40BN67, 40HE118, 40MD164, 40SY5, and 40TP73. Figure 3 shows the county by county distribution of the 89 sites examined during the West Tennessee survey, except for the two Humphreys County gunboat sites noted in Table 1.

Site record forms at the Division of Archaeology use a wide range of terms to classify the various types of activities that could have occurred in the past at any given location or site. Of these, the West Tennessee survey used fifteen military terms to categorize various types of activities or site components. Four additional terms were added to denote other components directly associated with Civil War military activities, i.e., headquarters, boat wreck, prison, powder magazine. Definitions for these terms as well as examples recorded during the survey appear below. Table 1 includes only those components observed during the 1992-1993 survey. Although the project focussed on sites of Civil War military activities, the project team often observed evidence of other types of cultural activity as indicated in the last column of Table 1.

Dennis Hart Mahan's 1836 military manual, Colonel H. L. Scott's 1864 Military Dictionary, and the more recent terminology proposed by David Wright in 1982 were the main sources of component definitions and classification. Most of the terms that appear below can also be found in the Middle Tennessee survey report, A Survey of Civil War Period Military Sites in Middle Tennessee (Smith, Prouty, Nance 1990:19-47), however, minor changes were made to reflect certain differences observed in West Tennessee.

Earthworks

Earthworks is a general category that refers to field fortifications constructed primarily of earth. West Tennessee examples represent four of the five subcategories or components previously listed on the Division's site survey record. The addition of a sixth component, the "Cremaillere Line" (defined by Mahan 1863:71,72), resulted from the project. The Table 1 column heading EW, or earthwork (undetermined), denotes the earthworks that lacked sufficient integrity for a specific classification. Figure 4 illustrates earthwork forms, and the graph in Figure 5 compares component totals. Descriptions of the five earthwork types or components observed in West Tennessee follow.
Figure 3. Map showing Civil War site totals by county for West Tennessee as of January, 1994 (excluding two Humphreys County gunboat sites).
### TABLE 1
CIVIL WAR PERIOD MILITARY SITES IN WEST TENNESSEE

| SITE NO. | HISTORIC NAME | EN | RD | RE | LU | CL | EW | FT | RR | BH | BS | BL | SE | LE | SH | LH | HD | BW | MP | PM | NM |
|----------|----------------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| **Benton County** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 40BN67 U | none | | | | | | X | | | | | | | | | | | | | X |
| **Fayette County** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 40FY214 U | none | X | | | | | | X | | | | | | | | | | | | | X |
| 40FY215 U | none | | | | | | X | | | | | | | | | | | | | X |
| 40FY216 U | none | | | | | | | X | | | | | | | | | | | | | X |
| 40FY217 U | Woodlawn | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | X |
| 40FY218 U | none | | | | | | | X | | | | | | | | | | | | | X |
| 40FY219 U | none | | | | | | | X | | | | | | | | | | | | | X |
| 40FY220 U | none | | | | | | | X | | | | | | | | | | | | | X |
| 40FY221 U | Fort Mickey | X | X | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 40FY222 U | none | | | | | | | X | | | | | | | | | | | | | X |
| 40FY223 U | none | | | | | | | X | | | | | | | | | | | | | X |
| 40FY224 U | none | | | | | | | X | | | | | | | | | | | | | X |
| 40FY225 U | none | | | | | | | X | | | | | | | | | | | | | X |
| 40FY226 U | none | | | | | | | X | | | | | | | | | | | | | X |
| 40FY227 U | none | | | | | | | X | | | | | | | | | | | | | X |
| 40FY228 U | none | | | | | | | X | | | | | | | | | | | | | X |
| 40FY229 U | none | | | | | | | X | | | | | | | | | | | | | X |
| 40FY230 U | Hancock Hall | | | | | | | X | X | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 40FY231 U | none | | | | | | | X | | | | | | | | | | | | | X |
| **Gibson County** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 40GB153 U | none | | | | | | | X | X | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 40GB155 U | none | | | | | | | X | | | | | | | | | | | | | X |
| **Hardeman County** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 40HM29 U | Fort McDowell | | | | | | | X | | | | | | | | | | | | | X |
| 40HM100 U | none | X | X | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 40HM101 U | none | | | | | | | X | X | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 40HM102 U | none | | | | | | | X | X | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 40HM103 U | none | | | | | | | X | X | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 40HM104 U | none | | | | | | | X | X | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 40HM105 U | none | | | | | | | X | | | | | | | | | | | | | X |

**En** = Entrenchment  **RD** = Redoubt  **RE** = Redan  **LU** = Lunette  **CL** = Cremaillere Line  **EW** = Earthwork (Undetermined)  **FT** = Fort  **RR** = Railroad Guard Post  **BH** = Blockhouse  **BS** = Battlefield-Small Engagement  **BL** = Battlefield-Large Engagement  **SE** = Short Term Encampment  **LE** = Long Term Encampment  **SH** = Short Term Military Hospital  **LH** = Long Term Military Hospital  **HD** = Headquarters  **BW** = Boat Wreck  **MP** = Military Prison  **PM** = Powder Magazine  **NM** = Non-Military Components
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(continued)

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EN = Entrenchment, RD = Redoubt, RE = Redan, LU = Lunette, CL = Cremaillers Line, EW = Earthwork (Undetermined), FT = Fort, RR = Railroad Guard Post, BH = Blockhouse, BS = Battlefield-Small Engagement, BL = Battlefield-Large Engagement, SE = Short Term Encampment, LE = Long Term Encampment, SH = Short Term Military Hospital, LH = Long Term Military Hospital, HD = Headquarters, BW = Boat Wreck, MP = Military Prison, PM = Powder Magazine, NM = Non-Military Components

* A Middle Tennessee county, but sites were recorded as part of the West Tennessee survey.
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CIVIL WAR PERIOD MILITARY SITES IN WEST TENNESSEE (continued)

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**Menlo County**

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| 40OB170 U | none          |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |

**Enos County**

| SITE NO. | HISTORIC NAME | EN | RD | RE | LU | CL | EW | FT | RR | BH | BS | BL | SE | LE | SH | LH | HD | BW | MP | PM | NM |
|----------|---------------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| 40OB170 U | none          |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |

**Notes:**
- EN = Entrenchment
- RD = Redoubt
- RE = Redan
- LU = Lunette
- CL = Cremaillere Line
- EW = Earthwork (Undetermined)
- FT = Fort
- RR = Railroad Guard Post
- BH = Blockhouse
- BS = Battlefield-Small Engagement
- BL = Battlefield-Large Engagement
- SE = Short Term Encampment
- LE = Long Term Encampment
- SH = Short Term Military Hospital
- LH = Long Term Military Hospital
- HD = Headquarters
- BW = Boat Wreck
- MP = Military Prison
- PM = Powder Magazine
- NM = Non-Military Components
### TABLE 1
CIVIL WAR PERIOD MILITARY SITES IN WEST TENNESSEE
(continued)

| SITE NO. | HISTORIC NAME          | EN | RD | RE | LU | CL | EW | FT | RR | BH | BS | BL | SE | LE | SH | LH | HD | BW | MP | PM | NM |
|----------|------------------------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| 40SY5 U  | Fort Pickering         | X  |    |    |    |    |    | X  |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| 40SY515 U| none                   | X  |    |    |    |    |    | X  |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| 40SY516 U| none                   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    | X  |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| 40SY517 U| none                   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    | X  |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| 40SY518 U| none                   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    | X  |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| 40SY519 U| none                   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    | X  |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| 40SY520 U| none                   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    | X  |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| 40SY521 U| none                   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    | X  |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| 40SY522 U| none                   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    | X  |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| 40SY523 U| none                   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    | X  |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| 40SY524 U| none                   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    | X  |    |    |    |    |    |
| 40SY532 U| Hunt-Phelan Home       | X  |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    | X  |    |    |    |    |
| 40SY533 U| Fort Germantown        |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    | X  |    |    |    |

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<th>Tipton County</th>
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| TOTAL COMPONENTS | 25 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 7 | 11 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 12 | 36 | 5 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 17 |

**TOTAL SITES: 89**

EN = Entrenchment  RD = Redoubt  RE = Redan  LU = Lunette  CL = Crenelliere Line  EW = Earthwork (Undetermined)  FT = Fort  RR = Railroad Guard Post  BH = Blockhouse  BS = Battlefield-Small Engagement  BL = Battlefield-Large Engagement  SE = Short Term Encampment  LE = Long Term Encampment  BH = Short Term Military Hospital  LH = Long Term Military Hospital  HD = Headquarters  BW = Boat Wreck  MP = Military Prison  PM = Powder Magazine  NM = Non-Military Components
A  Cremaillère or Indented Line
   a - Salients
   b - Re Enterings

B  Redoubt-Square (one of many forms)
   a - Traverse
   b - Outlet or Gorge

C  Redan
   ab - Face
   bc - Face
   ac - Gorge

D  Star Fort (one of several forms)

E  Lunette
   bc,cd - Faces
   ab,de - Flanks
   ae-Gorge (dotted line denotes angle of Pan Coupe)

F  Bastioned Fort
   abcd - Lunette Salient
   fghij - Lunette Salient
   ef - Curtain

Figure 4. Fortification forms (adapted from Mahan 1836).
Figure 5. Graph showing distribution of earthworks by type and affiliation for Middle and West Tennessee.
Entrenchment

In its simplest form a defensive entrenchment, or breastwork, consisted of a ditch and parapet, often hastily constructed under battle conditions. Parapets frequently included locally available materials such as stone or logs (Figure 6). When time allowed, construction of more elaborate entrenchments included features such as headlogs, outer ditches, palisades, advanced rifle pits, and abatis. Figure 7 illustrates features and terminology for entrenchments in West Tennessee.

Entrenchments are the most frequently occurring component on West Tennessee Civil War military sites. Some of the entrenchments are well-defined ditches and embankments, while others have been flattened or nearly obliterated by modern impacts. In the project area, 28 percent (n=25) of the sites include entrenchments compared to 41.2 percent (n=59) reported for Middle Tennessee (Smith et al. 1990:25). Confederates constructed 12 percent (n=3) of the entrenchments in West Tennessee; two are part of larger fortifications at 40LA50 and 40TP73. In sharp contrast, Confederates built 50.8 percent (n=30) of the total extant entrenchments in Middle Tennessee. The regional difference in percentages probably reflects an actual difference in the duration of military occupation. For example, the low proportion of Confederate entrenchments in West Tennessee can likely be attributed to the early Southern loss of the region in 1862.

Mahan states that entrenchments "... should be regarded only as accessories to the defence [sic] of a position" (1863:4). Yet construction of 52 percent (n=13) of the West Tennessee entrenchments (59 percent of the Federal sample) occurred under offensive conditions. Federals erected this concentration of earthworks between Pittsburg Landing and Corinth during an offensive advance.

After the Battle of Shiloh, the heavily outnumbered Confederate forces retreated to Corinth where two major railroads formed a junction that was strategically vital to both sides. Control of this heavily fortified position meant easy access into the heart of the south. Major General Henry W. Halleck arrived at Pittsburg Landing on April 11, 1862, to begin preparations for a full Federal advance on Corinth. His forces numbered 123,453 and consisted of the Union Armies of the Tennessee, the Ohio, and the Mississippi. Since the Confederates nearly overran the Federals at Shiloh, Halleck proceeded slowly southward to permit construction of line after line of entrenchments (Figure 8 indicates the location of these entrenchments). General U. S. Grant described the movement as "a siege from the start to the close...The National troops were always behind entrenchments..." (Grant 1885:195,196). The entrenchment construction in Tennessee began southwest of Monterey and proceeded at intervals for nearly twenty miles toward Corinth (see Lucius Barber's quote on pp. 14-15). These entrenchments have been described as the most extraordinary grouping of offensive earthworks constructed in Tennessee, and possibly in the entire Western Theater (Hagerman 1988:173).

The remaining portions of these entrenchments show evidence of site destruction from erosion, logging, cultivation, digging for relics, or development.
Figure 6. "THROWING UP BREASTWORKS IN THE WILDERNESS, FROM A SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME," by Civil War artist Alfred R. Waud, showing hasty construction of entrenchments by use of axe, bayonet, tin plates and cups, and bare hands (Webb 1884-1888:156).
Figure 7. Terminology and illustration for fortifications represented in West Tennessee (adapted from Scott 1864:284).
Figure 8. Tennessee portion of "Map of the Country Between Monterey, Tenn. and Corinth, Miss." (adapted from Matz 1862).
Early in the 1992 field season, the survey team recorded a well-preserved site, 40MY112, with a detached redan and a parapet and interior trench that extended for over 100 yards. Less than a year later, construction of a residential housing development greatly damaged this earthwork. This case represents only one example of site destruction that continues at an alarming rate; it also demonstrates the value of the survey in recording Civil War military site information that might otherwise be lost.

**Redoubt**

*Redoubt* generally refers to an earthwork enclosed on all sides (Figure 4B). Although a redoubt outline is often square or polygonal on level ground, on a hill or rising ground it generally conforms to the contour of the summit and may take on any enclosed shape or form. During the Civil War, redoubts were often built within larger earthen fortifications and were principally designed for defending hilltops or strengthening main lines.

The West Tennessee survey recorded four redoubts. The Federals constructed three of these (40HM104, 40MY111, and 40SY533) for the purpose of defending supply lines from Confederate attack. All three represent small railroad guard posts independent of larger defenses. Although the sample size is disproportionate, some comparisons can be made between the Middle and West Tennessee examples. For instance, only six of the 18 Federal redoubts recorded during the Middle Tennessee survey functioned as railroad guard posts; there the blockhouse more commonly provided supply line protection. In addition, seven of the recorded Federal redoubts in Middle Tennessee constitute portions of larger and more elaborate fortifications, whereas West Tennessee had few large-scale Federal military complexes. Finally, the other five Federal redoubts in Middle Tennessee defended hilltops or remote outposts, but the West Tennessee survey identified no Federal redoubts designed for this purpose.

The single Confederate redoubt recorded in West Tennessee is a component within a larger fortification site (Fort Wright, 40TP73). Early in the war, Confederates constructed the earthwork on a high bluff overlooking the Mississippi to help prevent river navigation by Federal flotillas (see General Historical Information section). By comparison there are two Confederate redoubts in Middle Tennessee. One redoubt, 40CF230, defended an adjacent town, and the other represents only a portion of a much larger fortified work, 40BD143, similar to the Fort Wright redoubt in West Tennessee.

**Redan**

*Redan* refers to a small V-shaped earthwork with two faces and a rear opening or "gorge." Redans provided cover for camps, battlefield fronts, advanced positions, roads, and bridges (Scott 1864:497). There are three recorded examples in West Tennessee.
Though redans were usually built for defensive purposes, the Federals constructed two during the offensive advance toward Corinth. Troops under the command of Brigadier General Thomas A. Davies built one redan on May 10, 1862, probably to protect troop movement along the old Monterey Road. This low profile earthwork, 40MY125, was barely visible during the survey. The second example is a small detached redan in front of an opening in a long parapet wall at 40MY112, the previously mentioned site that recently sustained damage from development.

The only recorded Confederate redan is within the Fort Pillow complex, 40LA50. A description of this redan and other Fort Pillow earthworks appears in Mainfort (1980).

**Lunette**

*Lunette* refers to an earthwork that is similar to a redan in function and appearance, with the addition of two flanks. There are two lunettes recorded in West Tennessee: a Confederate example at Fort Pillow (Mainfort 1980) and a Federal example in Fayette County (40FY214).

The Federals constructed the lunette at 40FY214 on a high point overlooking several strategic positions. The extant portion is one of the better preserved earthworks recorded during the West Tennessee survey. It contains over 200 feet of parapet wall, and its adjoining exterior ditch averages 15 to 20 feet in width and 11 to 12 feet in depth from the top of the parapet wall to the base of the ditch. An unusual design element of this lunette point is a "Pan Coupe," which is a small face constructed across a salient angle to allow a wider range of fire (Figure 4E). During the Civil War era, the Pan Coupe modification was most common on the V-shaped redan (Mahan 1863:12). The 40FY214 example is the only known lunette with Pan Coupe in Tennessee, and perhaps over a much broader area.

**Cremaillere (Indented) Line**

*Cremaillere line* refers to an earthwork placed between two advanced works that are too far apart to protect each other as well as the space between them. The branches of this type of line form salient and re-entering angles (Figure 4A). The long branches alternate from the middle point where either a salient or re-entering angle occurs (Mahan 1863:71,72). This indented line allows infantry and artillery cross fire in front of the advanced works (Wright 1982:58).

The West Tennessee survey recorded one Cremaillere line. Confederates constructed the line with slave labor in 1862 to support the Island No. 10 Mississippi River defenses (Figure 9, top). Other earthworks at this location originally included twelve batteries for mounting 28 pieces of heavy artillery on the Tennessee side of the river and five batteries for various sizes of cannon on Island No. 10 (Wright 1982:102-103). Field reconnaissance of the Island No. 10 defenses found that the earthworks are no longer extant, with the exception of the distinctive midsection of a Cremaillere line, 40LK54 (Figure 9, bottom). This line originally connected with a redan on its west end and continued eastward for nearly 3,500 feet where it ended.
DEFENSES AT ISLAND NO. 10
CREMAILLERE or INDENTED LINE OF BATTERY NO. 1
(originally 1,200 yards from Black Bayou Creek to the redan of Battery No. 1)

Figure 9. Top, historic map showing Confederate "Defenses of Island No. 10" (ORN, Vol. 22, following p. 748). Bottom, sketch map showing extant portion of the cremaillere or indented line of earthworks (the area shown right, center in top illustration).
with the natural flank of a bayou. The extant portion of the line is approximately 1,350 feet long. The parapet averages 25 feet wide and 4 feet high. The adjoining outer ditch is about 30 feet wide with a depth that is unknown due to standing water. This is the only known example of a Cremaillere line in Tennessee, and possibly over a much broader area of the South.

Earthwork (undetermined type)

The undetermined category accounts for three small, poorly preserved earthworks. Sites 40BN67 and 40FY224 are believed to be Federal constructions, and 40MY95 is probably Confederate, based on information obtained from local informants.

Other Fortifications

Fort

During the Civil War, fort was loosely applied to a variety of important positions, including isolated redoubts. In this report it refers to a large enclosed fortification that was sometimes supported by outer works such as lunettes and redans, or inner works such as blockhouses. The Middle Tennessee survey report illustrates basic fort configurations (Smith et al. 1990:Fig. 6). The West Tennessee survey team examined the remains of seven large enclosed fortifications, including Fort Pillow, Fort Wright, and Fort Pickering, as well as four previously unrecorded forts.

The purposes and overall plans varied for the seven West Tennessee forts. Table 1 shows the components identified at each fort site. Confederates designed Fort Pillow and Fort Wright to stop Federal gunboat navigation on the Mississippi. The occupying Union Army constructed Fort Mickey, Fort McDowell, Camp Sheldon, and an unnamed fort in Gibson County to protect major transportation routes. The Federals constructed Fort Pickering to fortify Memphis (Figure 10).

Fort Pickering was the largest and most elaborate of the West Tennessee fortifications. The fort's unique feature was the placement of artillery batteries upon prehistoric Indian mounds. Several historic drawings show artillery pieces on top of the mounds, and in an 1865 inspection report Brigadier General Z. B. Tower stated:

Fort Pickering was built...on the plateau south of the city....one mile and a half long and quite narrow...mostly a broken line...[of parapets and ditches]. The ditches are from six to seven feet deep....The interior work or keep is not so finished as the main work. There are some magazines near the parapet and under its cover. At the south end of the fort two ancient mounds are used as barbette batteries, which have a command over the country (QR, series I, vol. XLIX, p. 899-901).
ENLARGEMENT OF SOUTHERN PORTION OF FORT PICKERING MAP (TO LEFT)

B = LOCATION OF PREHISTORIC MOUND AND BATTERY SHOWING CANNON IN PLACE
C = LOCATION OF SMALLER MOUND

Figure 10. Fort Pickering, enhanced copy of an 1865 map (Davis et al. 1983:Plate CXIV).
Railroad Guard Post

Railroad guard post refers to a fortification that protected a vulnerable point such as a bridge or trestle, and included either a stockade, blockhouse, or earthworks such as redoubts and entrenchments. Permanent encampments adjacent to most railroad guard posts quartered small detachments of troops who manned the posts. Initially, Federals relied primarily on stockades for railroad guard post defense, but by 1864 preferred blockhouses for rail protection. The West Tennessee survey identified eleven sites believed to be railroad guard posts constructed by Federals. These railroad guard post sites include three redoubts, two entrenchments, two forts, two blockhouses, one undetermined earthwork, and one undefined (see 40MD219 under Stockade).

Stockade

Stockade, or picket, was an early frontier term that described a relatively simple enclosure designed in a German cross or square with bastioned corners (Mahan 1863:47). Vertical log walls contained loopholes for firing. Troops often dug outer ditches and heaped the earth against the exterior walls to add strength to the stockade. Before introduction of the blockhouse in 1864, Federals relied primarily on stockades to secure rail lines (see Blockhouse below). In fact, all known stockade examples in Middle Tennessee accompany railroad guard posts (Smith et al. 1990:31 and Figs. 8-10).

While none were recorded during the survey, historical information refers to at least one stockade in West Tennessee. A Confederate battery, under the command of John W. Morton, destroyed a stockade next to a bridge at Forked Deer Creek on December 19, 1862 (Wyeth 1959:100), in the general vicinity of site 40MD219. This site could be the location of the historically referenced stockade, but there was inadequate surface evidence to confirm an association.

Blockhouse

Blockhouse describes a Civil War defensive work primarily associated with railroad guard posts. In early 1864, Colonel William E. Merrill, Chief Engineer for the Army of the Cumberland, introduced the blockhouse in Middle Tennessee to provide greater defensive strength than the stockade (Merrill 1875). The original drawings survive for at least three of the several types of blockhouses that Merrill designed (Smith et al. 1990:Figs. 11, 12, and 13). The earliest blockhouse construction used heavy vertical timbers and incorporated flat, heavy timbered overheads, covered with dirt and capped with sloping board and batten to shed water. There was usually a cistern in the middle of the interior floor, and a single blockhouse entrance was occasionally placed below ground level. The exterior walls contained loopholes just above an embankment that was made with earth removed from the surrounding ditch. Two or more blockhouses often guarded the same trestle or bridge. As the war progressed the addition of horizontal timbers doubled the thickness of the walls in order to withstand artillery fire.
The West Tennessee survey recorded two Federal sites with blockhouse components, both in Hardeman County. The first, 40HM101, is adjacent to the Mississippi Central Railroad. The remaining earthen base of the structure measures approximately 30 by 30 feet. The height averages only a foot, probably due to erosion. A two-foot wide "L" shaped opening in the northeastern corner probably indicates the entrance to the blockhouse. The outer ditch is approximately five feet wide and two feet deep. Although no archival data was found that specifically related to this site, the shape and configuration suggest that it is a blockhouse remnant.

The second Federal blockhouse site, 40HM102, is situated nearly 1,000 feet from a Civil War railroad stream crossing. The remains of the structure measure approximately 40 by 50 feet; the base is nearly four feet high and four feet wide; and the outer ditch averages two feet deep and eight feet wide. In an 1863 report on the effective forces in Bolivar, Brigadier General M. Braymon makes brief mention of what is believed to be this site:

The absence of the first West Tennessee with General Dodge leaves me about forty-five mounted men; they inexperienced. I wish it understood that with my present force, small as it is, I can retire within the fortifications and repel any attack (OR series 1, vol. 17, pt. 2 p. 527).

Twenty-five blockhouse sites were identified in Middle Tennessee, compared to two in West Tennessee. The authors suggest that the difference partially results from the broader use of other types of earthworks for railroad protection in West Tennessee.

Battlefields

Battlefield - Small Engagement

Small engagement refers to a minimum contest among a relatively small number of troops. Many small engagements of insignificant strategic importance occurred in West Tennessee, and relatively few left definable archaeological evidence. Limited effort was made to identify small engagement battlefield sites, particularly the numerous sites of smaller skirmishes.

The survey team recorded three locations where actions occurred that were slightly larger than skirmishes. The first, 40MD164, is the site of "The Battle of Britton Lane" near Bolivar. This conflict occurred on September 1, 1862, between Confederates under the command of Brigadier General Frank C. Armstrong, and Federals under the command of Colonel Elias S. Dennis (Alexander 1962:31-46). The second, 40MY124, southwest of Shiloh, is the site of "The Battle of Fallen Timbers." There, on April 8, 1862, Confederate troops under the command of General Nathan Bedford Forrest fought with Federal troops commanded by General William T. Sherman (Sword 1983:424-426). A third small engagement occurred at
Battlefield - Large Engagement

An estimated 10,500 armed conflicts occurred during the Civil War. In a recent study the Civil War Sites Advisory Commission identified 384 "principal battles" that had a decisive influence on a campaign and a direct impact on the course of the war. According to the study there are 38 principal battle sites in Tennessee, second only to Virginia (Robinson et al. 1993:3). In the West Tennessee project, large engagement refers to actions, normally planned in advance, involving many corps or army level troops. Large engagement sites are similar to, but not necessarily the same as, "principal battle sites" defined in the Advisory Commission report. There are three large engagement battlefield sites in West Tennessee.

In the most renowned "Battle of Shiloh," Union and Confederate Armies suffered over 23,000 casualties, including more than 3,400 killed in action (Brewer 1987:20,21). The site's significance warranted designation as a National Military Park, and the archaeological site boundaries for 40HR 179 are congruent with the federally owned area. Due in part to the 1894 establishment of more than 95 percent of the original historic acreage as a National Military Park, Shiloh is one of the nation's few substantially protected battlefields (Robinson et al. 1993:6).

A lesser known West Tennessee engagement, "The Battle of Parker's Crossroads," occurred in Henderson County (40HE118). In late December 1862, forces under the command of General Nathan Bedford Forrest clashed with Federal troops under the joint command of Colonel Cyrus L. Dunham and Colonel John W. Fuller (OR, series 1, vol. 17, pt. 1, pp. 579,580,586,588). After the battle neither side wasted any time in reporting casualties. Union General Jeremiah C. Sullivan arrived on the field just after the conflict and reported that the Confederates suffered over 1,500 casualties, including over 200 killed (ibid.:552). Speaking of the high Federal losses, Colonel Forrest stated that:

As we had the field and saw them piled up and around the fences had a good opportunity of judging their loss ... The prisoners say that at least one-third of the command was killed or wounded. From all I could see and learn from many aides and officers they must have lost in killed and wounded from 800-1,000 men (ibid.: 553,596).

During the fall of 1993, limited test excavations within the site boundaries at Parker's Crossroads attempted to locate suspected battlefield burials. State Archaeologist George (Nick) Fielder directed the investigations with the assistance of the survey team (Prouty and Barker), State Representative Steve McDaniel, and several citizens from the area. Three test units confirmed the presence of one intact military grave and other empty grave shafts.
The third large engagement battlefield is the site of "The Battle of Davis Bridge," 40HM106. At this location along the Hatchie River on October 5, 1862, Confederate troops under the command of Brigadier General Dabney H. Maury and General Martin E. Green, along with the 1st Texas Legion under Colonel E. R. Hawkins, clashed with three Federal brigades led by Major General E.O.C. Ord. During the battle Major General S. A. Hurlbut replaced Major General Ord, who had received a canister shot wound (OR, series 1, vol. 17, pt. 1, pg. 403). General Maury's return of battle casualties reported 2,527 men either killed or wounded or missing. General Ord estimated Federal casualties at 570, including 46 killed (ibid.:304-307). A portion of this battlefield is currently owned by a private organization, the Sons of Confederate Veterans Association.

Encampments

Short-Term Encampment

Civil War troop movements resulted in numerous short-term encampments that left insubstantial archaeological remains. Due to the assumed low probability of archaeological evidence, the survey team made little effort to identify short-term encampment sites. A majority of the twelve recorded examples are incidental to other site components.

Long-Term Encampment

A number of locations in West Tennessee served as troop encampments for weeks, months, or even years. Long-term encampments potentially yield important archaeological information concerning the soldier's day to day activities, and provide contrasts between Union and Confederate material remains (Lees 1992). Figure 16 of the Middle Tennessee survey report shows two sketches of Union encampments similar to some of the 36 recorded in West Tennessee (Smith et al 1990:42).

Hospitals

Short-Term Military Hospital

Short-term military hospital refers to buildings used temporarily as make-shift hospitals following a battle, as well as tent hospitals close to the battle fronts, known as "forward dressing stations" (Chamberlin 1896: 418-428). The stretcher bearers in each regiment carried the wounded in from the field for treatment. Then ambulance wagons often transported soldiers from these temporary front-line hospitals to larger divisional field hospitals further to the rear.

In West Tennessee there are five recorded sites with short-term military hospital components. At two of these sites, 40FY217 and 40MD221, private residences temporarily sheltered the sick and wounded. The remaining three, 40HR179, 40MY124, and 40MY135, are sites where field hospitals had been established in battle situations.
Long-Term Military Hospital

In larger cities permanent buildings, known as "general hospitals," housed wounded Federal soldiers arriving from brigade depot or divisional hospitals (Dammann 1988: 26-28; Coggins 1962: 116). The West Tennessee survey recorded one long-term military hospital site, 40SY532, at the "Hunt-Phelan Home" in Memphis. Between 1863 and 1865, construction of barracks at this site accommodated the treatment of thousands of Federal soldiers. After the war teachers of the Freedmen's Bureau used the home to educate ex-slaves. President Andrew Johnson eventually returned the residence, which had been stripped bare by the Federals, to the owner, Confederate Colonel Hunt (Plunkett 1976:23). Today the Hunt-Phelan home is listed on the National Register of Historic Places.

Other Military Components

Headquarters

In the context of the survey headquarters refers to permanent buildings occupied by army, corps, or division level commanding officers for one night or up to several months. The grounds surrounding buildings that served as headquarters for long periods of time are likely to produce archaeological remains from the associated encampments of support troops.

In West Tennessee there are four recorded sites with standing residences that served as Civil War headquarters. Woodlawn, Hancock Hall, and the Hunt-Phelan home were Federal headquarters; the Reid home was Confederate.

Woodlawn, 40FY217, built in 1828 by War of 1812 veteran Major Charles Michie, served as headquarters for General Sherman during the Federal occupation of LaGrange (Tudor 1980:189). The building is listed on the National Register of Historic Places within the LaGrange Historic District.

Hancock Hall, 40FY230, a two-story Greek Revival home constructed in 1857, served as headquarters for General Grant during the spring of 1862 (Rhodes 1974:2). It is also listed on the National Register of Historic Places within the LaGrange Historic District.

The Hunt-Phelan home, 40SY532, constructed in the Greek Revival style with slave labor between 1828 and 1832, served as headquarters for Grant during his stay in Memphis. On the grounds of this site the General planned his campaign to capture Vicksburg, Mississippi (Plunkett 1976:23). The home also served as a hospital and is listed on the National Register of Historic Places.

The Reid home, 40MD222, is the only Confederate headquarters site recorded in West Tennessee. The home was built with slave labor for James and Nancy Reid of North Carolina between 1852 and 1857; it served as headquarters for
Colonel William Falkner and his Kentucky Regiment in August 1862 (Britton Lane Battlefield Association 1992:28).

**Boat Wreck**

Concurrent with the West Tennessee survey, the Division of Archaeology contracted with R. Christopher Goodwin and Associates to conduct an underwater investigation on the Tennessee River. The study identified two boat wrecks believed to be the remains of the U.S.S. Key West, 40HS266, and the U.S.S. Tawah, 40HS265, now preserved under a heavy layer of silt on the east side of the Tennessee River in Humphreys County (Irion and Beard 1993:56-72).

The U. S. Navy's Rear Admiral D. D. Porter directed the purchase of the U.S.S. Key West (Figure 11, bottom) for $33,800 on April 16, 1863, at Cairo, Illinois. The wooden stern-wheel steamer had a capacity of 207 tons and was 156 feet long, 4.5 feet deep, with a 32-foot beam (Irion and Beard 1993:33).

On June 19, 1863, Rear Admiral Porter directed the purchase of the converted ferry, U.S.S. Tawah (Figure 11, top), for $11,000, at St. Joseph, Missouri. The wooden side-wheel steamer weighed 108 tons, had a maximum length of 114 feet, a beam of 33 feet, and a depth of 3 feet and 9 inches. On September 30, 1864, the vessel was reportedly armed with two thirty pounders, four twenty-four pounders, two twelve pounders, and Waard Rifles (Irion and Beard 1993:33).

General Nathan Bedford Forrest sunk the two Union vessels during his November 1864 raid on the Johnsonville depot (Figure 1), which was a primary transfer point for Federal war materials as far south as Georgia. The Confederate raid demolished the transfer facility and destroyed 4 U. S. Navy gunboats, 17 barges, 14 steamboats, and 33 pieces of artillery (Higgs 1976:87). Lt. Col. William Sinclair, the assistant inspector General of the United States Army, estimated in his official report that Federal losses exceeded 2.2 million dollars (Wyeth 1959:465). In the summer of 1865, U. S. Navy Commander G. W. Rogers conducted a recovery operation aboard the flagship, Tempest, to salvage much of the armaments and other equipage from these vessels (ORN, series 27, vol. 1, pg 67).

**Military Prison**

The West Tennessee survey investigated two sites of former military prisons. Site 40MD220 designates the grounds of the extant Denmark Presbyterian Church. Built in 1854, the church briefly housed 87 Federal prisoners in 1862 (Britton Lane Battlefield Association 1992:28). On the upstairs walls of this building are the hand-written names of several Federal soldiers, along with their regiments and dates. The church is listed on the National Register of Historic Places. Another military prison once stood within Fort Pickering. Site 40SY5 contains several components associated with the early history and prehistory of Memphis, including Fort Pickering and the remains of an interior stockade where the Federals housed Confederate prisoners.
Figure 11. Artist renderings of the gunboats U.S.S. Tawah and U.S.S. Key West (drawn by David J. Meagher, 1992).
Powder Magazine

Many large fortifications included interior powder magazines, however, the survey identified viable evidence for only one such feature, located within the surviving earthworks of Fort Wright, 40TP73. Confederates completed construction of the fort in the late spring and early summer of 1861 on a high bluff overlooking the Mississippi River, approximately 35 miles north of Memphis. It originally consisted of defensive earthworks, four redoubts, associated encampments, and at least one brick-lined underground powder magazine. English war correspondent, William H. Russell, visited Fort Wright in June 1861 and noted that the fort’s batteries were "very ill-constructed and in only one was the [powder] magazine under decent cover" (quoted in Prouty and Rogers 1991:11). The extant brick magazine on the bluff at site 40TP73 is possibly the one mentioned by Russell. This feature, shown in Figure 12, is at present the only known Confederate-built powder magazine in Tennessee and may be the best preserved example in the South.

The West Tennessee survey included an investigation of a possible powder magazine at the Fort Pickering site, 40SY5. The brick feature is within a prehistoric Native American mound that supported an artillery battery identified on the 1865 Davis map (Figure 10, B). It seemed improbable for a powder magazine to be located directly below a heavy gun emplacement, however, the sealed entrance tunnel prevented determination of the interior form. In 1993 the Memphis City Park Commission granted permission for the survey team to open the entrance and record the interior. The investigation determined that the construction does not conform to military engineering designs for 1860s powder magazines, and the brick feature is probably part of the waterworks associated with a city park pavilion built on the mound in the late 1890s.
Figure 12. Extant powder magazine at Fort Wright, 40TP73. Interior photographic view (upper) and plan view (lower).
CONCLUSIONS

The 1992-1993 archaeological survey identified 84 previously unrecorded Civil War military sites in West Tennessee. The survey team also investigated five previously recorded sites to assess the current conditions. Information on the total of 89 sites is now part of the permanent site survey record maintained by the Tennessee Division of Archaeology. With the completion of this project and the one in Middle Tennessee (Smith et al. 1990), only the eastern geographic region of the state has not been systematically surveyed to record sites with Civil War military components. The success of the Middle and West Tennessee surveys encouraged the initiation of a final project in East Tennessee, after which the permanent statewide data base will include information for Civil War military sites in all of Tennessee's regions.

As a research tool the statewide data base provides a basis for the examination of issues such as the evolution of earthwork construction technologies and the effect of regional geographic variability on military tactics. As a preservation tool the statewide data base can facilitate site assessments needed for compliance with the National Historic Preservation Act.

One of the primary objectives of the West Tennessee survey was to assess the eligibility of sites for listing on the National Register of Historic Places. The study evaluated the 89 sites grouped below according to their prospective eligibility.

Group I includes seven sites currently listed on the National Register. In all but three cases—40LA50, 40HR179, and 40SY533—Civil War components were incidental to the site's National Register listing.

**Group I. Currently Listed on the National Register:**

- **Fayette County:** 40FY217 (Woodlawn), 40FY230 (Hancock Hall)
- **Hardin County:** 40HR179 (Shiloh National Military Park)
- **Lauderdale County:** 40LA50 (Fort Pillow State Historic Area)
- **Madison County:** 40MD220 (Denmark Presbyterian Church)
- **Shelby County:** 40SY532 (Hunt-Phelan Home), 40SY533 (Fort Germantown)
Group II includes 23 sites that are potentially eligible for listing on the National Register based on field survey information and archival data. These sites are relatively well preserved and are likely to contain intact archaeological deposits that have the potential for providing significant information about specific types of Civil War troop activities.

**Group II. Potentially Eligible for Listing on the National Register:**

- Fayette County: 40FY214, 40FY215
- Hardeman County: 40HM101, 40HM102, 40HM104, 40HM106
- Hardin County: 40HR175
- Henderson County: 40HE118
- Humphreys County: 40HS265, 40HS266
- Lake County: 40LK54
- Madison County: 40MD164, 40MD221, 40MD222
- McNairy County: 40MY108, 40MY111, 40MY124, 40MY127, 40MY128, 40MY134
- Obion County: 40OB170
- Shelby County: 40SY5
- Tipton County: 40TP73

Group III includes 53 sites that require archaeological testing to adequately assess their potential for listing on the National Register.

**Group III. Potential for Listing on the National Register Undetermined:**

- Benton County: 40BN67
- Fayette County: 40FY216, 40FY218, 40FY219, 40FY220, 40FY221, 40FY222, 40FY223, 40FY224, 40FY225, 40FY226, 40FY227, 40FY228, 40FY229, 40FY231
- Gibson County: 40GB155
- Hardeman County: 40HM99, 40HM100, 40HM103, 40HM105, 40HM107, 40HM108
- Madison County: 40MD219
- Haywood County: 40HD104
- McNairy County: 40MY95, 40MY109, 40MY110, 40MY113, 40MY114, 40MY115, 40MY116, 40MY117, 40MY118, 40MY119, 40MY121, 40MY122, 40MY123, 40MY126, 40MY129, 40MY130, 40MY131, 40MY132, 40MY133, 40MY135, 40MY136
- Shelby County: 40SY515, 40SY516, 40SY517, 40SY518, 40SY519, 40SY520, 40SY521, 40SY522

Group IV includes six sites negatively impacted by modern development, erosion, relic collecting, or other forms of site destruction. These sites are probably not eligible for listing on the National Register. However, the possibility of obtaining archaeological data from these sites can not be entirely ruled out.

**Group IV. Probably Not Eligible for Listing on the National Register:**

- Gibson County: 40GB153
- McNairy County: 40MY112, 40MY120, 40MY125
- Shelby County: 40SY523, 40SY524

An examination of the survey data indicates considerable variability in the types and configurations of earthworks erected by both the Confederate and Federal Armies in West Tennessee. However, two types are prevalent—simple entrenchments and complex entrenchments.

The construction of simple or hasty entrenchments followed the basic dictums of the pre-Civil War West Point professor and earthwork fortification specialist, Dennis Hart Mahan. According to Mahan's doctrine, troops should take advantage of natural cover when available, and should construct artificial entrenchments when natural obstacles were absent (Hagerman 1992:12). Artificial obstacles consisted of entrenchments (Figure 6) "made of trunks of trees laid on each other with a shallow ... trench behind them; the earth from which is thrown against the trunks" (Mahan 1836:67-68). The entrenchments gained additional strength by the
occasional use of abatis--large limbs of trees felled and pointed in the direction of the enemy. During the Atlanta campaign, General Sherman commented that:

... all the army was in position and the men were busy in throwing up the accustomed pile of rails and logs, which after a while assumed the shape of a parapet. The skill and rapidity with which our men constructed these is wonderful and is something new in the art of war (OR series 1, vol. 38, pt. 1, p.77).

Federal earthworks comprise 88 percent of the sites recorded in West Tennessee, which reflects the early Confederate loss of the region and a strong Federal occupation during the remaining war years. Of all the recorded Federal earthworks, 52 percent are simple entrenchments erected after the Battle of Shiloh during the Union advance on Corinth in May 1862. Federal forces moved slowly southwestward to Corinth, constructing line after line of offensive entrenchments. A number of these earthworks remain relatively intact. Field maps and topographical sketches completed during the site survey project will allow comparisons between the surviving physical data and the archival record, which in turn will edify the construction techniques for field fortifications and their appearance at the time of their use.

The second prevalent type of earthworks is the complex entrenchment, which includes redoubts, redans (or bastions) and curtains (a section of parapet wall consisting of straight or indented lines). The most frequent occurrence of complex entrenchments was along the Mississippi River. During the early years of the war the Confederate Army constructed a number of extensive fortifications to prevent Federal navigation of the South's most important waterway. Unseasoned Confederate military engineers made many of the works excessively complicated to garrison, and Federal flotillas readily bombarded them into submission (Bailey 1989:35).

As the war progressed in West Tennessee, engineering methods became more refined. Both Confederate and Federal earthworks took on more practical and utilitarian designs. Small defensible works accompanied by exterior troop camps replaced the extremely large fortifications that demanded massive troop strengths. The small works recorded during the West Tennessee survey offer a number of research possibilities. Legg and Smith demonstrate the intriguing potential offered by archaeological examinations of encampment sites (1989). Excavations on sites of defensive structures with encampments could answer questions regarding types of equipage issued to the troops, types of domestic activities the troops performed during occupation of the sites, or possible attacks on the earthworks and types of arms and equipage used by the attackers.

In the past, only two Civil War sites in West Tennessee have been archaeologically investigated, Fort Pillow (Mainfort 1980) and Fort Germantown (G.
These excavations resulted from efforts to develop public parks, and archaeological information helped interpret the events that took place there.

Scholars formerly believed that little could be learned from the excavation of battlefield sites (Hume 1969: 188). National Park Service Archaeologist Charles M. Haecker writes that:

> Until recently, battlefields were rarely investigated by an historical archeologist. Perhaps this bias against such investigations is partly based on the belief, once expressed by Noel Hume (1969), that "Little can usefully be said about battlefield sites .... [where] ... the salvage of relics becomes the be all and end all." If, indeed, a battlefield is nothing but a repository of random, rusting relics, then avoidance by the serious researcher is probably correct. Implicit in this line of reasoning is the assumption that archived documents and various other historical records sufficiently meet the needs of the interested historian (Haecker 1994:4).

However, recent archaeological work on historic United States battlefields demonstrates that such research can in fact provide important information concerning troop movements and locations, as well as the specific arms and materials used by these troops. One of the first such examples was a series of archaeological investigations in 1984 and 1985 at the 1876 Little Bighorn Battlefield in Montana, which provided the basis for the most accurate accounts of that engagement yet published and sparked much interest in battlefield archaeology (Scott et al. 1989; Fox 1993). A similar study in 1992 and 1993, concerning an 1846 Mexican-American War battlefield in Texas, initiated a complex task to determine the major battle line positions of the two opposing armies (Haecker 1994:151-155).

Archaeological research specifically concerning Civil War battlefields is still in its infancy, but a few studies have been completed. One such study provided clear information to redefine the areas that constitute the Mine Creek Battlefield in Kansas (Lees 1992). Additionally, testing at the site of the Battle of Gilgal Church in Georgia helped define a small portion of the battlefield (Braley 1987). Elsewhere, a Civil War battlefield study concerning "Latimer's Farm" in Georgia "provided an opportunity to link the ... [documented] ... events to specific locations on the ground and to clarify many issues about tactics and strategies" (Wood and Wood 1990:120). Another such study in Middle Tennessee has been conducted on a portion of a battlefield. Excavations at the Carter House, which was at the center of the heaviest fighting in the 1864 Battle of Franklin, yielded an interesting record of artifacts distributed according to several definable patterns that appear to be related to particular troop positions and activities (Smith 1995). And recent investigation at the Stones River National Battlefield in Murfreesboro, Tennessee, determined possible battle lines (Cornelison, forthcoming).
In spite of the existence of several large battlefields and numerous other Civil War military sites in West Tennessee archaeological excavation is sparse. It is premature to discuss what some of the particular research possibilities may be. Nonetheless, the research potential demonstrated at the Carter House and elsewhere clearly supports the pressing need for archaeological data as an adjunct to the vast amount of documentary material that exists concerning Civil War sites in West Tennessee.

In summary, the 1992-1993 survey of Civil War military sites in West Tennessee added information on 89 sites to the permanent record. Of the total, 33.7 percent are currently on or potentially eligible for the National Register of Historic Places; 6.7 percent are probably no longer eligible for listing due to loss of archaeological integrity; and 59.6 percent warrant further archaeological testing to assess their National Register potential.

The Civil War military sites in West Tennessee and other parts of the state are constantly threatened by site destruction (Smith et al. 1990:50-53). The permanent site record and this report are vehicles that will enhance the ability of government agencies, educational institutions, and concerned citizens to preserve the sites, and will provide future research opportunities to understand and interpret the Civil War and its role in the history and development of the State of Tennessee.
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Horn, Stanley F.


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Lees, William B.  

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Lytle, Andrew Nelson  

Mahan, Dennis Hart  

Mainfort, Robert C.  
Mallinson, David

Maness, Lonnie E.

Matz, Otto H.

McDonough, James Lee

Miles, Jim

Miller, Robert A.

Nichols, James L.

**OR (1880-1901)**

**ORN (1894-1914)**

Parks, Joseph H.
Plunkett, Kitty

Polk, William M.

Prouty, Fred M. and Stephen T. Rogers

Prouty, Fred M. and Gary Barker

Purdue, Howell and Elizabeth Purdue

Rhodes, Carolyn M.

Ridley, Bromfield L.

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Smith, Samuel D.

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APPENDIX A

Glossary of Civil War Era Military Terms
Relating to West Tennessee Sites
Glossary of Civil War Era Military Terms Relating to West Tennessee Sites

Abatis:
Rows of felled trees with the smaller branches removed and the remaining branches sharpened to create an obstacle to an advancing enemy (Scott 1864:9; Smith et al. 1990:Fig. 3).

Banquette:
A step at the base of a parapet on which a soldier could stand and fire over the parapet (Scott 1864:79); (Figure 7).

Banquette Slope:
An access ramp to the banquette (Wright 1982:323); (Figure 7).

Bastion:
A projection from a main work containing two faces and two flanks that provide flanking fire to the front of the main work (Scott 1864:81); (Figure 4).

Bastion Fort:
A polygonal work with bastions at the corners eliminating all dead spaces and angles; (Figure 4).

Battlefield: (see main text, "Component Definitions")

Berm:
A narrow shelf between the exterior slope and the scarp which prevented the parapet from collapsing into the ditch (Ripley 1970:249); (Figure 7).

Blockhouse: (see main text, "Component Definitions")

Counterscarp:
Exterior slope of the ditch below the glacis (Ripley 1970:249); (Figure 7).

Covered Way:
A narrow walkway between the counterscarp and the crest of the glacis along which troops could move concealed from view of the enemy (Scott 1864:212); (Figure 7).

Cremallere Line (Indented Line): (see main text, "Component Definitions")

Curtain:
A section of rampart that lies between two bastions and joins their two flanks together (Scott 1864:213) (Figure 4).
Dead Angle or Space:
Any angle or piece of ground that cannot be seen and cannot be defended from behind the parapet of a fortification (Scott 1864:214).

Detached Works:
Fortifications constructed beyond the musketry range of the main works. These works were part of the overall defenses of the main work (Scott 1864:236).

Ditch:
An excavation made in front or behind an earthwork providing the earth for that work. The ditch can serve as an obstacle to an attacker or a secure place for a defender (Scott 1864:247).

Embrasure:
An opening in a parapet wall through which an artillery piece or other weapon could be fired (Scott 1864:255); (Figure 7).

Encampment: (see main text, "Component Definitions")

Entrenchments: (see main text, "Component Definitions")

Exterior Slope:
The outer slope of the parapet facing the enemy. The exterior slope extended from the superior slope to the berm (Wright 1982:327); (Figure 7).

Fascine:
A long, cylindrical bundle of thin saplings and twigs used for sustaining the steep slopes of a trench (Scott 1864:283; illustrated in Smith et al. 1990:63).

Fort: (see main text, "Component Definitions")

Gabion:
An open-end basket woven from twigs and small branches which was filled with dirt and used to support interior slopes (Ripley 1970:250; illustrated in Smith et al. 1990:63).

Glacis:
A gentle slope on the opposite side of the ditch from the rampart. This slope eliminated dead spaces and protected the scarp from bombardment, but was rarely used in Civil War field works (Scott 1864:323); (Figure 7)
Head Log:
Logs placed horizontally on top of an earthwork and raised three to four inches above that work so that a soldier could fire a rifle through the opening without exposing his head to fire (Griffith 1986:35).

Headquarters: (see main text, "Component Definitions")

Hurdle:
A wicker or woven sapling wall, 3 to 4 feet high and 6 to 9 feet long, constructed between two upright poles. Hurdles were used as revetments (Scott 1864: 508; illustrated in Smith et al. 1990:64).

Interior Slope:
The angle extending between the superior slope and the banquette (Ripley 1970: 249); (Figure 7).

Loopholes:
Small openings in a wall through which weapons could be fired (Scott 1864:394; illustrated in Smith et al. 1990:64).

Lunette: (see main text, "Component Definitions")

Military Hospital: (see main text, “Component Definitions”)

Palisade:
Pointed stakes placed in the ground at an angle facing the enemy. The stakes were 6 to 8 inches in diameter and 6 to 10 feet long, and they were usually placed in front of a ditch as an obstacle (illustrations in Smith et al. 1990:27 and 64).

Pan Coupe:
The modification of a lunette or redan by the addition of a small face constructed across the salient angle to allow a wider range of fire (Mahan 1863:12) (Figure 4).

Railroad Guard Post: (see main text, “Component Definitions”)

Rampart:
A broad wall or embankment forming the main body of a fortification and consisting of a terreplein and a parapet (Scott 1864:484-485); (Figure 7).

Redan: (see main text, “Component Definitions”)

Redoubt: (see main text, “Component Definitions”)

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Revetment:
Material used to sustain an embankment, such as wood, stone, sandbags, sod, gabions, or facines (Ripley 1970:249).

Scarp:
The inner slope of the ditch under the berm (Ripley 1970:249); (Figure 7).

Stockade: (see main text, “Component Definitions”)

Superior Slope:
The top of the parapet extending from the interior slope to the exterior slope (Wright 1982:333); (Figure 7).

Terreplein:
The level space between the banquette slope and the interior slope of a rampart (Ripley 1970:248); (Figure 7).

Traverse:
An earthen wall or embankment perpendicular to the main rampart wall. The traverse provided protection from enfilading fire (Wright 1982:333); (Figure 4).

Tread:
The top platform of the banquette (Ripley 1970:249); (Figure 7).