RANSOMWARE TASK FORCE \$

Report Briefing for State/Local Leaders


Combating Ransomware: A Comprehensive Framework for Action

Megan Stifel
Global Policy Officer
Capacity & Resilience Program Director
Global Cyber Alliance
Co-Chair, Ransomware Task Force

John A. Davis
Retired U.S. Army Major General
VP, Public Sector
Palo Alto Networks
Co-Chair, Ransomware Task Force

The Rise of Ransomware

FIGURE 1 Average ransom in USD




Ransomware Targets:

- → Hospitals
- → Schools
- → Local police
- → Local governments
- → Small businesses
- → Large corporations

From The Coveware Quarterly Ransomware Report




THE IMPACT OF RANSOMWARE





A Global problem





The Ransomware Task Force

- 60+ experts from industry, government, law enforcement, civil society, and international organizations worked hand-in-hand
- Met Jan —April to centralize expertise from different sectors, create comprehensive solutions


Notable Sectors Included:

- → Incident Responders, Threat Intelligence
- → Cyber Insurance Providers, Brokers
- → Healthcare Entities
- → Cryptocurrency Analysis Firms / Exchanges
- → International Law Enforcement
- → Financial Regulators
- → Cybersecurity Providers
- → Corporations including Microsoft, Amazon
- → CTA, GCA, other civil society organizations



RTF Framework

1. Deter Ransomware Attacks









1. The United States should lead by example an execute a sustained, aggressive, whole of government, intelligence -driven anti-ransomware campaign, coordinated by the White House. This must include the establishment of 1) an Interagency Working Group led by the National Security Council in coordination with the nascent National Cyber Director; 2) an internal U.S. Government Joint Ransomware Task Force; and 3) a collaborative, private industry-led informal Ransomware Threat Focus Hub.



2. Coordinated, international diplomatic and law enforcement efforts must proactively prioritize ransomware through a comprehensive, resourced strategy, including using a carrot-and-stick approach to direct nation-states away from providing safe havens to ransomware criminals.



3. Governments should establish Cyber Response and Recovery Funds to support ransomware response and other cybersecurity activities; mandate that organizations report ransom payments; and require organizations to consider alternatives before making payments.



4. An internationally coordinated effort should develop a clear, accessible, and broadly adopted framework to help organizations prepare for, and respond to, ransomware attacks. In some under-resourced and more critical sectors, incentives (such as fine relief and funding) or regulation may be required to drive adoption.



5. The cryptocurrency sector that enables ransomware crime should be more closely regulated. Governments should require cryptocurrency exchanges, crypto kiosks, and overthe-counter (OTC) trading "desks" to comply with existing laws, including Know Your Customer (KYC), AntiMoney Laundering (AML), and Combatting Financing of Terrorism (CFT) laws.



The Ransomware Task Force: NEXT STEP

- Will not continue in its current form, although the group will likely stay connected for a time
- Different Task Force members will work together in smaller groups to implement the recommendations

Roll out Activities To Date And Planned:

- → On-going media engagement
- → Launch event on April 29th
- → US Congressional Hearing May 5th
- → CTA Webinar on May 6th
- → GCA Twitter Chat on May 12th
- → Brief to UK Government June 21st
- → White House briefing June 24th
- → Brief to Canadian Government July 6th
- → Brief to NIST July 14th
- → Brief to Australian Government July 26th
- → Brief to Netherlands Government July TBD



RANSOMWARE TASK FORCE LEADERS

RTF Co-Chairs

Megan Stifel, Global Cyber Alliance

John Davis, Palo Alto Networks

Michael Phillips, Resilience

Executive Director

Philip Reiner, Institute for Security and

Technology

RTF Working Group Co-Chairs

John Davis, Palo Alto Networks

Megan Stifel, Global Cyber Alliance

Michael Phillips, Resilience

Kemba Walden, Microsoft

Jen Ellis, Rapid7

Chris Painter, The Global Forum on Cyber Expertise

Michael Daniel, Cyber Threat Alliance

Philip Reiner, Institute for Security and Technology



RANSOMWARE TASK FORCE Membersh

loel de la Garza, al 6z

Temi Adebambo, Amazon Web Services

David Forcsey, Aspen Digital

Jeff Troy, Aviation ISAC

Rich Friedburg, Blackbaud

Austin Berglas, BlueVoyant

Lewis Robinson, Center for Internet Security

Roger Francis, CFC Underwriting

Don Spies, Chainalysis

Pamela Clegg, CipherTrace

Brad Garnett, Cisco

Matt Olney, Cisco

Peter Lefkowitz, Citrix

Bill Siegal, Coveware

James Perry, CrowdStrike

Stéphane Duguin, The CyberPeace Institute

Yonatan Striem-Amit, Cybereason

Neil Jenkins, Cyber Threat Alliance

Andy Thompson, CyberArk

Ari Schwartz, Cybersecurity Coalition

John Banghart, Cybersecurity Coalition

Ryan Weeks, Datto

Patrice Drake, Deloitte

Keith Mularski, Ernst & Young

Stacy O'Mara, FireEye

Nick Bennett, FireEye

Jill Fraser, Jefferson County, CO

Mark Orsi, K12 SIX



RANSOMWARE TASK FORCE Membersh

Kent Landfield, McAfee

Ginny Badanes, Microsoft

Kaja Ciglic, Microsoft

Ping Look, Microsoft

Jennifer Coughlin, Mullen Coughlin LLC

John Guerriero, National Governors Association

Justin Herring, New York Department of Financial

Services (NYDFS)

Adrian McCabe, Palo Alto Networks

Sam Rubin, Palo Alto Networks

Sean Morgan, Palo Alto Networks

Bob Rudis, Rapid7

Scott King, Rapid7

Tod Beardsley, Rapid7

Allan Liska, Recorded Future

Katie Nickels, Red Canary

Adam Flatley, Redacted

Davis Hake, Resilience

Michael Convertino, Resilience

Chris Lynam, Royal Canadian Mounted Police's National

Cybercrime Coordination Unit (NC3)

Jeff Bonvie, Royal Canadian Mounted Police's National

Cybercrime Coordination Unit (NC3)

Kevin Gronberg, SecurityScorecard

Richard Perlotto, The Shadowserver Foundation

Beau Woods, Stratigos Security

James Shank, Team Cymru

Michael Garcia, Third Way



RANSOMWARE TASK FORCE Membersh

Ciaran Martin, University of Oxford Blavatnik School of Government

Eleanor Fairford, U.K. National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC)

U.K. National Crime Agency (NCA)

Bridgette Walsh, U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)

U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

Jonah Hill, U.S. Secret Service (USSS)

Bobby Chesney, U.T. Austin Strauss Center



RANSOMWARE TASK FORCE Staff

Sarah Powazek, RTF Program Manager, IST
Alexander Riabov, Communications Manager, IST
Leah Walker, Future Digital Security Leader Fellow, IST
Chuck Kapelke, Writing Support
Kathryn Pledger, Pledger Designs
Emma Hollingsworth, Global Cyber Alliance



QUESTIONS



Legislative opportunities

- Action 2.1.1. Develop new levers for voluntary sharing of cryptocurrency payment indicators
- Action 2.1.2. Require cryptocurrency exchanges, crypto kiosks, and over -the-counter (OTC) trading "desks" to comply with existing laws
- Action 2.2.3: Clarify lawful defensive measures that private -sector actors can take when countering ransomware
- Action 3.3.1: Update cyber-hygiene regulations and standards
- Action 3.3.2: Require local governments to adopt limited baseline security measures
- Action 3.3.3: Require managed service providers to adopt and provide baseline security measures
- Action 3.4.2: Expand Homeland Security Preparedness grants to encompass cybersecurity threats
- Action 3.4.3: Offer local government/SLTTs/critical NGOs conditional access to grant funding for compliance with the
- Ransomware Framework (2.1.1)
- Action 3.4.4: Alleviate fines for critical infrastructure entities that align with the Ransomware Framework
- Action 3.4.5: Investigate tax breaks as an incentive for organizations to adopt secure IT services
- Action 4.1.1: Create ransomware emergency response authorities
- Action 4.1.2: Create a Ransomware Response Fund to support victims in refusing to make ransomware payments (incentivize non payment of ransoms)
- Action 4.1.3: Increase government resources available to help the private sector respond to ransomware attacks
- Action 4.2.4: Require organizations and incident response entities to share ransomware payment information with a national government prior to payment
- Action 4.3.2: Require organizations to review alternatives before making payments
- Action 4.3.3: Require organizations to conduct a cost -benefit assessment prior to making a ransom payment

