

STATE OF TENNESSEE

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Opinion No. 09-67

Admissibility of Videotaped Statements in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions

QUESTION

An amendment to proposed legislation would allow for the admissibility of a videotaped statement made by a child under the age of thirteen years describing any act of sexual abuse so long as the child testifies or is available to testify at trial, and the video possesses certain guarantees of trustworthiness. The legislation would also require that a forensic interviewer in the video meet certain qualifications, and that the trial court make findings on the record about the admissibility of the recording. Is this proposed legislation constitutional?

OPINION

The proposed legislation would not violate the United States Constitution; however, it may be vulnerable to attack under the Tennessee Constitution.

ANALYSIS

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” Article I, § 9 of the Tennessee Constitution affords the accused even greater constitutional protection by establishing the right “to meet witnesses face-to-face.” See *State v. Stephenson*, 195 S.W.3d 574, 591 (Tenn. 2006).

In *Crawford v. Washington*, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54 (2004), the United States Supreme Court ruled that out-of-court statements that are “testimonial” in nature by a witness absent from trial are inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause unless the declarant is unavailable to testify and the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. It follows that the threshold question is whether the statement challenged is “testimonial.” *State v. Maclin*, 183 S.W.3d 335, 345 (Tenn. 2006). The Tennessee Supreme Court has held that “testimony involves a formal or official statement made or elicited with a purpose of being introduced at a criminal trial.” *Id.* at 346. Likewise, the United States Supreme Court has observed that out-of-court statements made to investigators are testimonial when “the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.” *Davis v.*

Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006). The type of out-of-court statement that this legislation seeks to make admissible is thus by its very nature “testimonial” for purposes of the Confrontation Clause. *Crawford* holds, however, that the admission of a prior testimonial statement does not violate the Confrontation Clause if the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial. *Crawford*, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9; *Idaho v. Wright*, 497 U.S. 805, 814 (1990). Thus, the proposed legislation, as amended, would not violate the United States Constitution.

The admission of this testimony, however, may still violate the “face-to-face” provision of the Tennessee Constitution. While the Tennessee Supreme Court has established that this provision grants greater protection than that of the United States Constitution, it has yet to define the extent of this enhanced protection. *See, e.g., Stephenson*, 183 S.W.3d at 591. Pennsylvania, however, has an identical confrontation clause, as noted by the Tennessee Supreme Court in *State v. Deuter*, 839 S.W.2d 391, 395 (Tenn. 1992). In *Commonwealth v. Ludwig*, 584 A.2d 281 (Pa. 1991), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that its confrontation clause did not allow for the use of testimony through one-way closed circuit television. Indiana’s state constitution likewise requires face-to-face confrontation, and that state’s supreme court also found that testimony presented by means of a one-way closed circuit television violates its confrontation clause. *Brady v. State*, 575 N.E.2d 981, 988 (Ind. 1991). As the proposed legislation would allow a victim to testify without being “face-to-face” with a defendant at the time of that testimony, a Tennessee court could conclude that the statements made admissible by the bill would violate Tennessee’s confrontation clause.

The proposed legislation may also be vulnerable to attack under Article II, § 2 of the Tennessee Constitution. An out-of-court statement that otherwise meets the requirements of the Confrontation Clause may still be inadmissible hearsay. *Crawford*, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9; *Idaho v. Wright*, 497 U.S. 805, 814 (1990). Hearsay is any statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Tenn. R. Evid. 801(c). Hearsay is not admissible as evidence except as provided by the Tennessee Rules of Evidence or “otherwise by law.”¹ Tenn. R. Evid. 802. The video testimony contemplated by this bill would be hearsay, and no existing exception to the hearsay rule provides for its admissibility. Thus, the proposed legislation seeks to craft an exception to the hearsay rules.

“Only the Supreme Court has the inherent power to promulgate rules governing the practice and procedure of the courts of this state, [and] this power cannot be constitutionally exercised by any other branch of government.” *State v. Mallard*, 40 S.W.3d 473, 480-81 (Tenn. 2001); Tenn. Const. Art. II, § 2. Our Supreme Court, however, has recognized a degree of overlap in the lines of demarcation between the branches of government and has thus “frequently acknowledged the broad power of the General Assembly to establish rules of evidence in furtherance of its ability to enact substantive law.” *Id.* at 481. The Court has emphasized that any consent of courts to such legislative regulation of inherent judicial authority is purely the result of “inter-branch comity and is not required by any principle of free government.” *Id.* at

¹ Tennessee courts have yet to determine if the phrase “otherwise by law” implicitly authorizes the creation of additional hearsay exceptions by statute, or if that phrase only anticipates the creation of further exceptions as a result of judicial decisions.

482. The Supreme Court will not extend such considerations of comity to any act of the legislature that would “strike at the very heart of a court's exercise of judicial power” and represent the exercise by the legislature of an inherently judicial power, such as the powers to hear facts, to decide issues of fact made by the pleadings, and to decide questions of law involved in a case. *Id.* at 483.

No Tennessee court has directly addressed the issue of whether the creation of hearsay exceptions by the legislative branch violates Art. II, § 2 of the Tennessee Constitution by usurping an inherently judicial power.² The Arizona Supreme Court, however, considered a similar law providing a hearsay exception for the out-of-court statements of minors describing sexual abuse in *State v. Robinson*, 735 P.2d 801 (Ariz. 1987). Citing its constitutional authority³ to make rules relative to all procedural matters in any court, the court ruled that the hearsay rules “go to the heart of the judicial process” and found the creation of this hearsay exception by the state legislature to be unconstitutional. *Id.* at 807.

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² In *Baldwin v. Knight*, 569 S.W.2d 450 (Tenn. 1978), the Tennessee Supreme Court encountered a law that provided for a legislatively-created hearsay exception for formal statements of Medical Malpractice Review Boards; however, because no party questioned the admissibility of the statement at issue, the Court declined to address the issue of the law’s constitutionality.

³ A.R.S. Const. Art. 6, § 5 states, “The Supreme Court shall have . . . power to make rules relative to all procedural matters in any court.”

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